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PATENT PORTFOLIOS AS SECURITIES 
MICHAEL RISCH† 
ABSTRACT 
  Companies of all types are buying, selling, and licensing patents—
not just individual patents, but many patents bundled into large 
portfolios. A primary problem with these transactions is that the 
market is illiquid: parties cannot identify holders of relevant 
portfolios, they cannot agree on the value of portfolios, and the 
specter of litigation taints every negotiation. 
  This Article presents a new way to improve market formation and 
integrity by proposing that patent portfolios be treated as securities. If 
patent-portfolio transactions are treated like stock transactions, sellers 
steering clear of fraud laws may be forced to disclose information 
about patent value. Furthermore, patent transactions previously 
consummated in “dark markets” might now be traded in public 
clearinghouses. Ultimately, parties that openly transact will develop 
objective pricing methodologies that reduce the costs of negotiation 
and decrease the leverage that portfolio holders exert on potential 
licensees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patents are the new securities. They are bought and sold with 
frequency.1 Their resale value is often derived from an expected 
stream of revenue.2 In short, they are valuable assets that can 
appreciate, depreciate, and result in gains and losses upon sale. As 
such, they should be tradable on a market like securities. This Article 
suggests one way to improve market formation for patents: by 
treating patent portfolios like securities. Despite the recognition that 
patent markets are important3 and that portfolios are important,4 this 
 
 1. See Anne Kelley, Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 117 
(2011); Nicholas Figueroa & Carlos J. Serrano, Patent Trading Flows of Small and Large Firms 
25–27 (Apr. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2251084. 
 2. 14 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 6833 (rev. vol. 2012).  
 3. See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of 
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1740 (2000) (“It is clear that the ability of the 
owners of intellectual property rights to transfer these rights in whole or in part to others is an 
important feature of the systems. The rights can easily arise in the hands of persons or firms who 
are not in the best position to exploit them. In order to involve others in the full exploitation of 
the economic potential of the right, the owners must be able to enter into a wide range of 
arrangements with other firms.”); Aleksandar Nikolic, Securitization of Patents and Its 
Continued Viability in Light of the Current Economic Conditions, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 393, 
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Article is the first to study the implications of treating patent 
portfolios as securities per se. Given the reality of patent aggregation, 
we should consider securities laws as a way to make current markets 
better. 
This is not to say that patents have never been associated with 
securities. Indeed, some speculators have packaged patents into 
bundled portfolios that are then sold in pieces to investors, which is a 
traditional way that patents, mortgages, or any other asset classes are 
“securitized.”5 Investors are then paid their portion of any licensing or 
litigation profits associated with the bundle. But patent portfolios that 
have not been packaged into a traditional security have escaped 
regulatory scrutiny, despite having many similar features. Like 
traditional securitization, portfolios are bought and sold, and the 
owner of the portfolio obtains profits. This Article examines how 
patent portfolios might be treated as securities even when ownership 
of the portfolio is not divided among many investors. 
Individual patents differ from company stock, the most 
traditional security, in important ways. Unlike stock, patents are not 
necessarily representative of the profits generated by an underlying 
business. Instead, patents generate revenue directly when sold or 
licensed, thus providing only a piece of a patent-holder’s profits. 
Further, the value of any particular patent will be both disputed and 
volatile.6 Parties to a transaction often disagree about whether a 
 
409 (2009) (“Another factor that could lead to increased patent securitization is the creation of 
regulated markets for intellectual property, providing information and access to trading.”). See 
generally Naomi Lamoreaux and Kenneth Sokoloff, Long-Term Change in the Organization of 
Inventive Activity, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12, 686 (1996) (describing the growth of patent 
markets in the nineteenth century); Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How To Make a 
Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257 (2007) (discussing the importance of information about 
patent prices to the creation of a well-functioning market).  
 4. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1 (2005) (outlining a theory of patent value in which the worth of a patent portfolio is 
greater than the sum of its individual parts). 
 5. See, e.g., Nikolic, supra note 3, at 404 (discussing traditional patent securitization); Jeff 
Leung, Patent Securitizations, Patently Bad Idea – Risk/Benefit Approach Reveals Possible 
Reasons for Lack of Patent Securitizations, IPL NEWSL. (Am. Bar. Ass’n Section of Intellectual 
Prop. Law), Fall 2006, at 4, 4–5 (discussing portfolio requirements for traditional securitization). 
See generally Mario Calderini & Cristina Odasso, Intellectual Property Portfolio Securitization: 
An Evidence Based Analysis (unpublished manuscript) (discussing potential markets for 
traditional securitization), available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=
5618&cf=32.  
 6. Indeed, accounting rules do not allow employee-invented patents to be booked as 
assets because there is no purchase price associated with them. Malcolm T. Meeks & Charles A. 
Eldering, Patent Valuation: Aren't We Forgetting Something? Making the Case for Claims 
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patent is valid and/or infringed;7 if either proves untrue, the patent 
loses its value.8 Furthermore, patentees might interpret any party 
seeking a license for its product as an admission of infringement, thus 
tainting prices.9 As a result, each patent—indeed, each patent 
transaction—has a different value negotiated secretly.10 This means 
that the low volume of trading and related lack of price information is 
insufficient to set a market price. These features seem far removed 
from stock. If patents are the new securities, they are highly illiquid 
securities. 
Patent portfolios—aggregated groups of patents—are different;11 
they exhibit many similarities with traditional securities. As with any 
volatile asset, diversifying many patents into a portfolio deemphasizes 
 
Analysis in Patent Valuation by Proposing a Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific 
Discount Rate Using the CAPM, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 194, 195 (2010); cf. Zvi 
Griliches, Bronwyn H. Hall & Ariel Pakes, R&D, Patents, and Market Value Revisited: Is There 
a Second (Technological Opportunity) Factor? 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 2624, 1988) (finding a $3.2 million standard deviation in patent value). 
 7. Amy L. Landers, Patent Valuation Theory and the Economics of Improvement, 88 TEX. 
L. REV. 163, 166 (2010) (“Additional contingencies complicate patent valuation for licensing 
discussions, including claim scope, validity, and enforceability.”); Meeks & Eldering, supra note 
6, at 198 (“As a result, licensing negotiations essentially become ‘mini’ patent trials . . . .”). 
 8. See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 609, 611–13 (2009) (discussing the comparative merits of rules that apply 
generally to standards that are applied to individual patents); Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal 
(Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1125–34 (2010) 
(describing pressure for rules from the U.S. Patent and Trade Office and pressure for standards 
from the Supreme Court); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 
771, 799–800 (2003) (arguing that standards applied to each patent are better for patent policy 
than formal rules). 
 9. See F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and 
the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2003) 
(“Unfortunately, patent pricing presents a difficulty not present in most stock option deals 
because merely inquiring about acquiring a license will affect its price.”). Like Schrödinger’s cat, 
a patent is both worthless and priceless until investigated. 
 10. Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios Through 
Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 465 (2007) (“In light of the 
prerequisites to achieve patent protection, the value of a patent, by definition, must be 
unique.”). 
 11. Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner have argued that portfolios are valuable 
even if individual patents are not. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 52 (“The 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts: the benefits of patent portfolios in the modern 
innovation environment are, we suggest, so substantial as to explain the heretofore largely 
unexplained ‘value gap’ at the heart of the patent paradox.”). But see Alexander I. Poltorak, 
Valuing Individual Patents Comprising a Portfolio, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT (Law Journal 
Newsletters, Phila., Pa.), Oct. 2003 (reprint at 2) (proposing a valuation that assumes the 
portfolio value must equal the sum of the values of each patent), available at 
http://www.generalpatent.com/files/PSM-Oct2003.pdf. 
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the highs and lows of any given piece of the pie. Although the value 
of each patent in the portfolio may vary wildly, the portfolio as a 
whole will maintain a more stable value than its constituent parts.12 
Even though a portfolio reduces the ability of any single 
constituent patent to affect overall value, diversified portfolios are 
still subject to systemic risk. They face this risk because aggregated 
patents usually cover similar technology.13 Thus, if patents in general 
or patents relating to the technology in the portfolio become more 
valuable, then the portfolio will increase in value.14 If, however, 
patents as a whole or in a technology area become devalued, then the 
portfolio will decrease in value. Furthermore, portfolios of specific 
types of patents, such as those covering a specific product,15 will rise 
and fall with court rulings that affect them. But a properly diversified 
portfolio would include patents covering different types of products 
in a technology area to mitigate this risk.16 The risk analysis, however, 
is similar to that of securities: even diversified securities portfolios 
might be subject to systemic risk. 
Because of these and other similarities, this Article proposes that 
patent portfolios, but perhaps not individual patents, should be 
treated like securities to help patent markets behave more like public 
securities markets. The benefits of securities markets are well-
recognized, or at the very least well-idealized. Securities markets are 
transparent: everyone knows the price. They are open: anyone with 
enough money may purchase stock. They are somewhat efficient and 
 
 12. Cf. Jiaqing “Jack” Lu, Decompose and Adjust Patent Sales Prices for Patent Portfolio 
Valuation, LICENSING ECON. REV., Mar. 2013, at 71, 75 (finding that portfolio value grows 
nonlinearly with portfolio size), available at http://www.lesk.org/include/downfile.asp?folder=
board&filename=11_LU5Edit.pdf.  
 13. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 29–30 (“In the patent portfolio theory, 
relatedness is an important feature: unlike corporate stock portfolios, for example, where broad 
diversification is a typical goal, patent portfolios are more narrowly focused within a 
technological field.”). 
 14. See id. at 39–40 (arguing that portfolios reduce risk associated with uncertainty in law). 
Parchomovsky and Wagner assume that legal changes will affect different types of patents 
differently, rather than all patents for each change. Presumably, some changes will affect every 
patent as well. 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 30 (describing specific portfolios targeted at a particular product, 
process, or problem). 
 16. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 
2005, at 75, 81 (arguing that patentees file related continuation applications to hedge their bets 
that an original application becomes valueless); Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 30 
(“[W]hile patent portfolios consist of related patents, this is not to say they are not diverse in 
any respect. Indeed, it is the ability to leverage the differences among collected patents that 
makes patent portfolios a powerful tool in the modern, innovation-driven marketplace.”). 
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transparent: anyone offering to buy or sell can complete a transaction, 
with the stock going to parties willing to pay the agreed price. There 
are exceptions, of course, but stock markets are generally well-
behaved.17 
In contrast, patent markets are opaque: no one knows the price, 
who owns the patents, or even whether a relevant patent exists.18 
They are illiquid and shallow: only those with patents may sell,19 and 
only those with potentially infringing products will acquire licenses.20 
They are inefficient: parties cannot agree on prices, and injunction 
risks might inflate prices.21 Patent markets are not well-behaved. 
Despite these shortcomings, patent portfolios behave more like 
securities than individual patents. Many types of companies trade 
them, and they could be considered securities under the law. 
Importantly, securities treatment will reach patent sale and licensing 
transactions that patent law is ill-equipped to handle. 
Treating patent portfolios as securities would improve market 
integrity with respect to particularly abusive mass demand-letter 
campaigns by treating such campaigns as public offerings. Further, 
ordinary transactions, even if exempt from registration requirements, 
would be subject to heightened disclosure requirements. With respect 
to forming better patent markets, a primary benefit would be to 
emphasize the importance of disclosure and market clearinghouses 
for patent-portfolio licensing. This, of course, has always been 
possible, but treating portfolios like securities may help create a 
functioning patent-portfolio license, sale market, and culture of more 
efficient pricing. 
 
 17. To be sure, nonpublic markets are less liquid and efficient, but even illiquid 
transactions with multiple parties will apply the same price to all buyers, and that price is often 
used for later negotiations. 
 18. Dietmar Harhoff, The Role of Patents and Licenses in Securing External Finance for 
Innovation, 14 EURO. INVEST. BANK PAPERS, no. 2, 2009, at 74, 83 (2009), available at 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/efs/eibpapers/eibpapers_2009_v14_n02_en.pdf; Lemley & 
Myrhvold, supra note 3, at 257. 
 19. Presumably, of course, one could short sell a patent with the hopes of obtaining it later. 
Because patents are unique and illiquid, however, such short sales would be extremely risky. 
 20. Here, too, there are many types of securities (maybe even most) that are also shallow 
and illiquid. 
 21. See RPX Corp., Investor Presentation 8 (June 2013), available at http://files.
shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-5XYKB4/0x0x523306/4CC42999-6166-4C95-8192-
9CE54759BE8D/RPXQ3Invest_Web.pdf (describing the risks of litigation as they affect the 
valuation of patent portfolios). 
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This proposal sidesteps the normative question of whether such a 
market would be socially beneficial and thus should exist at all. Some 
might argue that a market for the right to exclude others harms 
innovation,22 and thus ought to be discouraged. Others see some 
benefit in a market for invention,23 and might argue that this 
particular type of market should be encouraged. These are important 
questions to be studied, but they concern how the system should be 
rather than how it currently operates. This Article presumes that, for 
political or economic reasons, current practices will continue, and that 
securities law is a way forward. This Article presents its proposal in 
three parts. 
Part I discusses how companies aggregate patents into large 
portfolios. According to conventional wisdom, such aggregation has 
traditionally been pursued by companies that do not sell any products 
or services themselves, so-called nonpracticing entities (NPEs).24 
Though many criticize NPEs, recent scholarship and patent 
aggregation activities by product and service companies imply that 
portfolio aggregation is no longer just about NPEs, if it ever was. 
Part II explores the properties of patent portfolios, showing how 
they fit the definition of securities. To the extent that patent sales and 
licenses are contracts that provide speculative value, they may fit the 
definition of “investment contract” and thus constitute a security.25 
Part III suggests some legal and practical implications of treating 
portfolios as securities. First, if patent portfolios are securities, then 
they will be subject to a new regulatory framework that improves 
market integrity. They may not be sold to the public without 
registration, they will be subject to disclosure rules, and they will face 
heightened fraud prohibitions. Second, securities regulation may 
 
 22. See Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls 14–15 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 09-12, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2146251 (describing the harms associated with assertion of patents against small companies). 
 23. See, e.g., Oskar Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4–7) (describing the benefits of a market for invention), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205996.  
 24. Commentators dispute what constitutes an NPE. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are 
Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 630 (2008); 
Michael Risch, What is a Patent Troll?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 15, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/04/what-is-a-patent-troll.html. 
 25. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1) 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (including “investment 
contract” in the definition of “security”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c(a)(10) (2012) (same). For further discussion of patent portfolios as investment-contract 
securities, see infra Part II.C. 
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encourage the formation of transparent market clearinghouses and 
development of methods for determining pricing, both of which are 
critical to an efficient market function. 
I.  NONPRACTICING ENTITIES, PRODUCT COMPANIES, AND PATENT 
AGGREGATION 
Patents do not confer the right to practice the claimed invention. 
Instead, they only provide the right to exclude, giving the owner of 
the patent the ability to seek damages and/or injunctions against 
others who practice the patent.26 Thus, when two competitors own 
patents, it gives neither the freedom to operate, but both the right to 
cross-sue each other for infringement on the products they make. 
This leads to a sort of détente in which competitors will either leave 
one another alone or cross-license their patents. These product- and 
service-providing companies are often synonymously called practicing 
entities or productive companies. 
Patents are also alienable: they may be bought or sold at will. 
The lure of profits has led to the rise of patent aggregators who 
purchase patents and enforce them against others who infringe the 
acquired patents. These aggregators, called NPEs, patent assertion 
entities (PAEs), or, more pejoratively, patent trolls, buy patents and 
assert them against others as their primary source of revenue. 
As the number of NPEs has grown, so has the number of their 
critics. The conventional wisdom is that NPEs block innovation by 
forcing productive companies to pay for a patent license without 
adding any value to society themselves.27 A core problem, some 
people argue, is that NPEs have no fear of being cross-sued for 
infringement, and thus are unwilling to settle on reasonable terms—
there is no détente. But the conventional wisdom is incomplete. 
Patent aggregation is not limited to NPEs anymore, if it ever was. 
 
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 27. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs of NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 21–22), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2091210 (“Effectively, what defendants pay in costs as a result of 
NPE litigation reduces their own R&D budgets. This is because companies become targets for 
litigation mainly when they introduce innovative products. Hence R&D managers must 
anticipate NPE costs as part of the cost of innovating.”). Of course, this statement takes no 
account of the huge profits these companies earn and refuse to spend on R&D or even return to 
shareholders. See Jeff Macke, Einhorn Sues Apple! Will His Battle Save the Stock? YAHOO! FIN. 
BREAKOUT (Feb. 7, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/einhorn-sues-apple-battle-
save-stock-160610124.html.  
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A. Nonpracticing Entities and Invention 
Though NPEs do not make products, they bear more similarities 
to practicing inventors than many previously thought. First, 
aggregation by NPEs is not particularly new; some of the most 
litigious NPEs have been active for twenty-five years or more.28 
Furthermore, some of the most famous patentees in history, like 
Thomas Edison, did not make products for all of the patents they 
enforced.29 Even IBM today does not make products relating to many 
of its patents.30 In short, the long history of U.S. invention has been 
one of patent acquisition and enforcement, with and without 
accompanying products. 
Second, NPEs obtain their patents from product and service 
companies. A recent study of litigious NPEs showed that patents 
asserted by NPEs came from corporations, more than 40 percent of 
which were classified by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as 
having more than five hundred employees.31 Thus, even though NPE-
owned patents are not currently practiced by NPEs, they came from 
research and development efforts prior to sale, much like patents of 
practicing companies. 
Third, NPEs do not appear to have any special impact on 
venture capital investment. In theory, any investment decision should 
depend on downstream liquidation or recapitalization opportunities 
should the company fail. In practice, studies show that startups do not 
seem to consider sale to NPEs as part of the exit plan.32 The rise of 
NPE activity may change this in the future, but it implies that patents 
 
 28. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 474–75 (2012); see also 
Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 3, at 12,690–91.  
 29. Henry R. Nothhaft & David Kline, Was Thomas Edison a Patent Troll?, IPWATCHDOG 
(June 1, 2010, 6:03 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/06/01/was-thomas-edison-a-patent-
troll/id=10829 (describing several inventors that relied on licensing business models). 
 30. See infra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 31. Risch, supra note 28, at 485–86. Of the patents originally obtained by companies, only 
21 percent came from businesses dedicated to licensing. Id. About 75 percent of the business 
entities were corporations, and of those, 17.5 percent received venture capital and 20 percent 
were publicly traded. Id.; see also Colleen Chien, A Race to the Bottom, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 
MAG., Jan./Feb. 2012, at 13 fig. 2 (describing sources of patents).  
 32. See Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High 
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1281–83 (2009) (finding that venture capitalists do not closely 
examine patent quality before investing); Nothhaft & Kline, supra note 29, at 492 (“NPEs may 
have minimal investment-inducing benefits even if they marginally increase the likelihood of 
investment.”). 
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issued to startups all start out the same: owned by a productive 
startup. They do not all end up in the same place, and where they end 
up is a mix of product and NPE portfolios: some are held until they 
expire, some are held until the startup becomes large, some are held 
while the startup remains small, some are sold while the startup is 
operating, and some are sold when the startup fails. 
Fourth, NPEs purchase and enforce many of their patents from 
individuals. For example, 28 percent of the patents asserted by the 
most litigious NPEs were originally obtained by individuals, as 
compared with 14 percent of the patents asserted by individuals in all 
U.S. litigation.33 Thus, NPEs take claims that would otherwise be 
asserted separately and aggregate them into portfolios that may be 
asserted simultaneously. This is not unlike what product companies 
do. They too obtain their patents from individuals: their employees. 
But company patents come preaggregated to the employer. By 
purchasing patents from individuals and aggregating them, NPEs 
create portfolios. However, rather than creating patent portfolios by 
paying salaried employees, they simply buy them directly. 
Although nonemployed individual inventors are usually 
nonpracticing themselves, the United States has long had an ethos of 
the individual inventor,34 just as it has for product companies. Indeed, 
one study found that technology patents held by individuals at 
issuance had a high patent value when compared with those held by 
many product companies.35 Thus, many people are slower to criticize 
individuals, even though they make no products. 
For those patents in the portfolio that are litigated to judgment, 
NPE-owned patents do not appear to be significantly lower in quality 
than other litigated patents. About 28 percent of the judgments 
completely invalidated NPE-owned patents, whereas 20 percent of all 
judgments completely invalidated a patent.36 This means that NPE 
 
 33. See Risch, supra note 28, at 495–96; see also Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua 
Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on U.S. Litigation, 
11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 376 (2012) (showing that NPE activity moves inversely with 
individual litigation filings: when one goes up, the other goes down). 
 34. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the 
Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 54 (2009) (“The garage inventor is as American as apple 
pie. We enjoy stories of independent inventors, working against all odds to provide society with 
amazing technological breakthroughs.” (footnote omitted)). 
 35. Kramer, supra note 10, at 485–86. 
 36. Risch, supra note 28, at 482. This comparison is also not completely appropriate. The 
study of all patents counted orders that denied summary judgment. The NPE study did not 
count such orders, which means the denominator was smaller, increasing the percentage. 
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patents are not so much lower in quality that they are somehow 
different from patents generally. To the extent there is a patent 
quality problem, it is not limited to NPEs. 
Finally, it is likely that NPEs will accept some amount of money 
to settle a case; licensing is the business model after all.37 Of course, 
the defendant-licensee may not be happy with the amount, but some 
settlement amount is usually available. When productive companies 
sue each other, plaintiffs may be unwilling to settle at any price.38 
Instead, they may demand an injunction. As productive companies 
obtain more patents, the likelihood of an injunction increases.39 
Indeed, though many NPE patents are invalid, productive 
companies have obtained invalid patents as well. Little separates the 
quality of these patents other than the current owner. 
B. Product-Company Patent Aggregation 
Individuals have long assigned their patents to companies that 
aggregate them.40 Usually, such patents come from employees who 
assign inventions to their employers; the same is true for virtually 
every university.41 As the number of employees and inventions grow, 
so grows the number of patents. In fact, large companies have long 
aggregated many more patents than small companies, although some 
evidence suggests that large company aggregation includes a higher 
 
 37. See, e.g., Public Comment from Barry Leff, IPNav, to Fed. Trade Comm’n Patent 
Assertion Entity Activities Workshop (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
comments/pae/pae-0010.pdf (“When such an operating company seeks sales injunctions against 
competitors, it is because they want to increase their market share. When a PAE asserts a 
patent, it’s not looking to stifle competition: it’s looking to get paid for its intellectual 
property.”). In rare cases when the patent is exclusively licensed, the exclusive licensee might 
enforce the patent and require an injunction. 
 38. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV., (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 46–47), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2269087 (discussing litigation and settlement differences among 
NPEs and competitors). 
 39. See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2012, at A1 (noting that “as patent portfolios have expanded, so have pressures to use them 
against competitors”); cf. Richard Stallman, Let’s Limit the Effect of Software Patents, Since We 
Can’t Eliminate Them, WIRED (Nov. 1, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/11/
richard-stallman-software-patents (arguing that Apple may be the most dangerous patent 
holder).  
 40. See, e.g., Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 3, at 12,690 (conducting a quantitative 
analysis showing the increase in patent assignments over time).  
 41. See generally Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 36–49 (2013) 
(documenting a shift from “academic exceptionalism” to universities’ embrace of patenting). 
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proportion of lesser value patents when compared with small 
companies.42 
One famous example is IBM, which has more patents than any 
other company.43 IBM’s patenting activity created two advantages. 
First, the company is rarely, if ever, sued for patent infringement by 
its competitors.44 The reason is simple: any company that might sue 
IBM for infringing a patent would face counterclaims for infringing 
several IBM patents.45 The result is either no action or a cross-license 
agreement between IBM and the other party. Second, IBM has used 
its portfolio as a source of revenue. One example is its 1993 license of 
all personal-computer patents to Dell for $293 million.46 IBM has 
reportedly earned more than $10 billion in licensing, and some credit 
the company’s intellectual property exploitation with its turnaround 
in the early 1990s.47 
More recently, large companies have begun to acquire large 
portfolios of patents from a variety of sources other than their own 
employees such as individuals, acquired companies, and other large 
companies. They have done so for three reasons. First, every patent 
purchased by a productive company cannot be purchased by an NPE. 
Thus, aggregation is a defense mechanism to avoid assertions by 
 
 42. See DIANA HICKS, CHI RESEARCH, INC., SMALL SERIAL INNOVATORS: THE SMALL 
FIRM CONTRIBUTION TO TECHNICAL CHANGE 11 (2003), available at http://archive.sba.gov/
advo/research/rs225tot.pdf (finding that small firms generate a disproportionate number of 
important patents as measured by citations); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s 
Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2128 
(2000) (reporting that 70 percent of patents are sought by large firms compared with 11 percent 
by small firms).  
 43. Sarah Frier, IBM Granted Most U.S. Patents for 20th Straight Year, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 
10, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-10/ibm-granted-most-u-s-patents-
for-20th-straight-year.html. 
 44. See, e.g., Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES, June 24, 2002, at 44, 45–46. RPX 
Corporation Data shows that IBM has been sued by nine operating companies since 2005, and 
only one since 2009. Email from RPX Corp. to Michael Risch, Professor of Law, Villanova 
Univ. Sch. of Law (June 3, 2013, 11:46 AM) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 45. See Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem 
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 321–22 (2010) (“In defensive 
contexts, patents are used to ward off suits, as well as to gain access to technology and to further 
technological adaptation.”); Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 36 (noting the defensive 
benefits of portfolios). 
 46. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1328 (2009). Indeed, this license 
was an amendment to an earlier license that likely contemplated additional royalties. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 47–48 (“This led not only to the 
remarkable growth of the company’s patent portfolio, but also to a significantly reduced ratio of 
research dollars spent to patents earned.”). 
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others. The value of defensive aggregation is that every patent 
purchased will not be used against it. Additionally, there is an 
ongoing economic benefit to any purchaser who might be infringing a 
patent: the avoided license fees. Of course, the purchase price is 
simply a prepayment of those potential fees and defense costs. 
Second, companies with too few patents to effectively defend 
themselves from lawsuits filed by competitors have begun aggregating 
patents to better defend themselves.48 There are several recent 
examples. For example, a consortium including Microsoft, Apple, and 
Oracle purchased patent portfolios from Novell and Nortel, two 
former technology leaders, for $4.5 billion.49 In response, Google 
(which had made its own bid of $900 million), published a blog post 
essentially accusing the consortium of behaving like patent trolls.50 
Google then purchased Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion in a deal 
that most observers agreed was for Motorola’s mobile-phone patent 
portfolio,51 which has since been asserted against Apple. In another 
example, Yahoo recently sued Facebook for patent infringement, 
much to the dismay of Yahoo employees who invented the subject 
matter of the patents.52 In response, Microsoft purchased a large 
portfolio of patents from America Online (AOL), and sold half of 
 
 48. See id. at 57 (“By contrast, firms lacking effective patent portfolios will find themselves 
increasingly unable to reach beneficial accommodations with their more portfolio-rich 
competitors, and will be forced to the more costly, more prolonged, and higher risk strategy of 
patent litigation.”); id. at 56 (arguing that need for aggregation explains growth in small firm 
patenting in the 1990s); see also Recent Patent Assignments, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 15, 2013), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/recent-patent-assignments.html.  
 49. Elizabeth Woyke, An Insider on the Nortel Patent Auction and Its Consequences, 
FORBES (July 7, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethwoyke/2011/07/07/an-
insider-on-the-nortel-patent-auction-and-its-consequences. 
 50. See David Drummond, When Patents Attack Android, GOOGLE BLOG (Aug. 4, 2011, 
12:25 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/when-patents-attack-android.html (“They 
want to make it harder for manufacturers to sell Android devices. Instead of competing by 
building new features or devices, they are fighting through litigation. This anti-competitive 
strategy is also escalating the cost of patents way beyond what they’re really worth.”). 
 51. Evelyn M. Rusli & Claire Cain Miller, Google To Buy Motorola Mobility for $12.5 
Billion, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 15, 2011, 9:16 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/
08/15/google-to-buy-motorola-mobility. 
 52. Michael J. de la Merced, As It Warned, Yahoo Sues Facebook over Patents, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Mar. 25, 2012, 4:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/yahoo-sues-
facebook-over-patents. Software engineers generally do not favor the use of patents to limit 
other software development. See, e.g., Andy Baio, A Patent Lie: How Yahoo Weaponized My 
Work, WIRED (Mar. 13, 2012, 3:44 PM), http://www.wired.com/business/2012/03/opinion-baio-
yahoo-patent-lie.  
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those patents to Facebook to use in defense against Yahoo.53 This 
purchased aggregation is very similar to home-grown aggregation by 
companies building portfolios through employees. 
Third, and related to the first two points, defense against NPEs 
and competitors allows a greater freedom to innovate.54 In fact, some 
posit that a large portfolio improves a company’s ability to acquire 
additional innovation in the form of patents and other development.55 
This also means that the company can enhance its licensing efforts by 
including acquired patents in a portfolio along with patents developed 
in-house. 
Although scholars might lament a patent system that encourages 
more and more aggregation, there is no question that the practice has 
expanded, nor that it was ever limited to NPEs. As such, regulations 
should apply to all aggregators. 
II.  PATENTS AND PORTFOLIOS AS SECURITIES 
This Part considers whether patents and patent portfolios should 
be considered securities. The analysis leads to three conclusions: (1) 
portfolios, rather than individual patents, should be considered for 
securities treatment; (2) the securities laws would bring regulatory 
benefits not associated with patent laws, thereby justifying securities 
treatment; and (3) portfolio transactions could meet the test 
articulated in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.56 (the Howey test) for securities, 
though the argument probably better applies to portfolio licensing. 
A. Patents vs. Portfolios 
This Article focuses on patents aggregated into large portfolios. 
Whereas the rules should arguably apply to individual patents and 
 
 53. Facebook Buys AOL Patents from Microsoft in $550m Deal, BBC (Apr. 23, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17820851.  
 54. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 34. For example, Parchomovsky and 
Wagner discuss the growth of Gemstar, a productive company that at one point acquired TV 
Guide through the acquisition of patents. Id. at 50–51. 
 55. See id. (“Thus, holding a patent portfolio can have a multiplier effect on the range of 
innovations that can be accessed by the firm.”); see also Kitch, supra note 3, at 1739 (“[A]n 
author or inventor, or their employers, will usually hold not one, but multiple rights, which will 
often be interrelated. The assembly of a portfolio of multiple intellectual property rights is one 
plausible way that an economic monopoly can be created. However, it is essential that firms are 
able to obtain multiple rights. . . . A single patent claim, much less a single patent, often covers 
only a small part of the technology needed to market a commercially competitive device.”).  
 56. SEC. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
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patent portfolios in the same way, theory and practice imply that 
portfolios should be treated differently than individual patents.57 
Individual patents are hotly contested, and their values turn on very 
specific characteristics. Thus, regulating a patent as a security would 
be like regulating a single share of stock as a security; it can be done, 
but what’s the point? Potential buyers and licensees can perform due 
diligence and challenge the patent as necessary.58 Although a single 
patent may fall into the definition of security just as a single share 
might, the costs of regulation are likely to outweigh the benefits that 
securities regulation can offer in addition to patent law. 
Portfolios, on the other hand, increase the patent-holder’s 
leverage even if the additional patents are of dubious quality. The 
owner can assert many claims, which make diligence and defense far 
more costly. Further, even if one patent is removed from the equation 
due to invalidity or noninfringement, there are many more patents in 
the portfolio. 
These features of portfolios have two effects. First, they are far 
more efficient than single patents.59 One owner is the point of contact. 
One license agreement can resolve disputes. Challenging an entire 
portfolio is fruitless. Indeed, even the owner has a disincentive to sue 
on the entire portfolio.60 Asserting five hundred, or even one 
hundred, patents in a case is practically impossible. Second, the 
increased costs and risk of damages may give portfolio owners 
bargaining power that makes royalty extraction inefficient due to 
hold-up problems.61 
 
 57. See, e.g., Vincent Chiappetta, Patent Exhaustion: What’s It Good For?, 51 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1087, 1133–35 (2011) (discussing differing approaches to patent exhaustion 
when considered on a patent-by-patent basis versus the market as whole). 
 58. Others might even fund patent litigation as well. Jack Ellis, Patent Litigation as an Asset 
Class, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG., Nov./Dec. 2012, at 43, 44–45.  
 59. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 38, at 42 (“Complementary inputs cost less when 
they are acquired from a single supplier with market power than when the same inputs are 
acquired from multiple suppliers, each of which has market power. Aggregation of patents that 
are likely to confer some degree of market power in the hands of a single patent holder is 
therefore likely, all other things equal, to reduce technology users’ costs.”). 
 60. See id. at 9 (“Patent aggregators file very few suits relative to their impact . . . .”). 
 61. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1991, 1995–96 (2007); see Michael A. Carrier, Patent Assertion Entities: Six Actions the Antitrust 
Agencies Can Take, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 2013, at 1, 2–3 (discussing the harm of 
collecting patents by recounting IBM’s allegation of patent infringement against Sun Systems); 
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 38, at 43–44 (discussing NPE disaggregation into shell 
companies which may facilitate anticompetitive strategic action); Mark R. Patterson, Leveraging 
Information About Patents: Settlements, Portfolios, and Holdups, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 483, 504 
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Both of these features favor applying securities laws to patent 
portfolios. To the extent that securities laws favor information 
disclosure, more regulation is needed because portfolios do not lead 
to the same types of diligence as individual patents. Securities laws 
might provide an information-forcing function to provide information 
about the portfolio. Further, to the extent that securities laws aid in 
market formation, securities treatment may help create private 
markets with better transparency and pricing mechanisms. 
How might a portfolio be considered a security? As noted above, 
portfolios are not traded like other securities. However, a portfolio 
might be monetized in three ways that might parallel a “trade”: 
Purchase. First, an entire portfolio may be purchased outright,62 
such as when Microsoft purchased 925 patents from AOL.63 
License. Second, a potentially infringing party might license a 
portfolio, such as when Dell licensed the use patents from IBM. 
Holding companies. Third, buyers may purchase shares in a 
company or investment fund that asserts patents with or without a 
promise not to assert. Thus, the company “holds” the patents, and 
investors invest in the company’s stock. This comes closest to the 
traditional notion of “securitization.”64 Publicly traded NPEs, like 
Acacia, represent a portfolio held in a fund separate from any 
promise not to sue; Google could buy shares in Acacia, but still be 
sued by Acacia. Because Acacia is publicly traded, there is no 
relationship between a potential infringer’s decision to invest in the 
company and the decision to license patents owned by the company. 
Intellectual Ventures (IV) shows the complexity that is added 
when a portfolio is held by a privately financed company. Most 
observers agree that IV has acquired more patents than any other 
NPE, perhaps by far, and also that its corporate structure is very 
 
(2013) (discussing the competitive advantage of large portfolios due to the increased difficulty 
of evaluating infringement). But see Jiaqing “Jack” Lu, The Myths and Facts of Patent Troll and 
Excessive Payment: Have Nonpracticing Entities (NPEs) Been Overcompensated?, 47 BUS. 
ECON. 234, 242 (2012) (finding a lack of empirical evidence that NPEs are overcompensated). 
 62. This includes an exclusive license, which allows the licensee to enforce patents. 
 63. Facebook Buys AOL Patents from Microsoft in $550m Deal, supra note 53.  
 64. See Nikolic, supra note 3, at 401–04 (discussing “special purpose entities” that hold 
securitized patents). 
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complex.65 The company includes several funds that acquire and 
license patents and also conducts its own research and development.66 
Potential infringers might obtain a license to some part of the 
overall portfolio held by a fund. Those same potential infringers 
might also invest in the fund, but there is more likely to be a 
relationship between the licensing and investment decision as part of 
the overall negotiation. If the licensee invests, then when the 
company obtains a new patent, IV could also provide some of the 
licensing royalties it receives as profits to that investor, just as it 
would provide to other investors. If the investor has obtained a broad 
enough license, then each additional patent acquisition might also 
include a promise not to sue on the new patent, which acts as a type 
of defensive strategy. It is no surprise, therefore, that large product 
companies have been listed in court documents as interested parties 
in IV patent litigation.67 It is also no surprise, though, that other 
companies might simultaneously be investors and lawsuit defendants 
if their licenses were more limited. 
The third type of portfolios—those owned by holding 
companies—are easily handled, because the investor purchases 
corporate stock in the company that is no different than other 
securities.68 The securities laws would apply in the same way, at least 
as to investors in the holding company.69 But the first two categories 
are not quite as analogous to stocks. Neither type is likely to be 
offered to the public; most patent licenses are privately offered. Thus, 
further analysis is necessary to determine if transactions in these 
categories should be regulated like securities. 
 
 65. See Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
1, 3–7, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf (detailing IV patents and 
corporate structure). 
 66. Funds, INTELL. VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com/index.php/about/funds 
(last visited Aug. 19, 2013). 
 67. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 65, at 39–40 (describing the parties in the IV 
litigation). 
 68. See Nikolic, supra note 3, at 401–02 (describing how patents may be securitized by 
placing them in a special purpose entity). 
 69. See, e.g., Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying 
securities laws to a company whose sole asset was a patent intended to be sold to a third party); 
Argentum Int’l, LLC v. Woods, 634 S.E.2d 195, 199 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (applying securities 
laws to a company w hose primary asset related to patent ownership). 
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B. A Need for Securities Regulation 
The policy of the securities laws meets goals that patent law 
cannot reach. The securities laws are generally recognized to have 
two primary purposes, primarily effected through disclosure and 
penalties for false disclosure. First, they are intended to protect 
buyers of securities.70 If information is false, buyers will be duped. 
Second, they are intended to protect the markets for securities.71 If 
information is unreliable, then markets will be unavailable. Thus, one 
may ask whether patent buyers and licensees are the types of 
purchasers that require protecting and whether patent markets, which 
are primarily nonpublicly traded, can benefit from securities rules. 
As discussed above, patent portfolios create leverage that may 
require regulation.72 These portfolios can be extraordinarily efficient 
at closing licensing transactions, but in the way that a bulldozer is 
efficient at demolishing things. The efficiency may limit the ability to 
challenge the portfolio, leaving any party approached by an 
aggregator at the mercy of the portfolio owner.73 This, of course, is an 
overstatement. Potential defendants defend infringement suits and 
even file for declaratory relief on a regular basis.74 
Even so, however, some regulation might be beneficial to 
enhance market integrity and limit overzealous aggregators by 
requiring more disclosure. If implemented well, aggregators may 
welcome such regulation because courts may be more likely to affirm 
transactions in a regulated, high-integrity market. 
One consideration is whether there are nonsecurities regulatory 
schemes that might provide protection. There is little need for 
securities laws if patent laws are sufficient. For example, in United 
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,75 the Supreme Court considered 
whether housing cooperatives were securities. Though it did not rely 
on them solely, the Court emphasized the extensive regulations 
already applicable to the challenged housing cooperatives.76 Further, 
 
 70. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See supra Part II.A. 
 73. See Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES (June 24, 2002), 
http://www.forbes.com/asap/2002/0624/044_print.html (describing IBM’s portfolio-licensing 
practices). 
 74. Chester Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment To Forum 
Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2012). 
 75. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
 76. Id. at 842–44. 
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the existence of other regulation may not be enough to exempt a 
transaction from the securities laws, either, if the regulation is 
insufficient to protect buyers and sellers or the market.77 
The lack of alternative regulation—at least the type of regulation 
provided by securities treatment—favors the application of securities 
law. Patent law provides little alternative regulation. To be sure, there 
are several regulatory provisions in patent law, but each of these 
relate to challenging the validity of a single patent. Other than 
granting the inalienable right to challenge a patent’s validity,78 these 
regulations are not intended to protect buyers or licensees of patents, 
let alone patent portfolios. The patent-aggregation market is 
completely unregulated by patent law. As a result, securities law may 
be necessary to protect market participants. Patent law barely 
addresses market transactions. 
Regulators have considered whether antitrust law should apply 
to aggregator hold-up, but such laws will be unlikely to provide the 
same benefits as securities laws. First, one must prove that each 
transaction is anticompetitive. Second, the remedies are more of a 
bludgeon than a regulator. Third, that law is primarily proscriptive 
and would not provide a framework for each and every transaction, 
nor would it aid in market formation. 
C. Securities and the Howey Test 
Securities are defined broadly in the Securities Act of 193379 (the 
1933 Act) as 
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in 
any profit-sharing agreement, . . . investment contract, . . . fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, . . . or warrant or right 
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.80 
The highlighted terms, “profit-sharing agreement” and 
“investment contract,” emphasize that a security is essentially any 
investment in a forward-looking venture in which the profit comes 
 
 77. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 541–42 (1996) (holding that securities laws 
might apply to viatical settlements, even though state laws regulate them already). 
 78. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969) (allowing licensees to challenge 
patents even when they agree not to do so).  
 79. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
 80. Id. (emphasis added). 
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from the work of others.81 The Supreme Court has noted that 
securities should be defined broadly, with substance trumping form.82 
In other words, according to a former Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) senior attorney and commissioner of California 
corporations, “the statutory plan is apparently designed to regulate 
interests which secure capital for a venture, from investors, in 
exchange for a ‘piece of the action.’”83 
Obtaining a patent from the government does not create a 
security; securities only exist when others obtain an interest in the 
original asset.84 Thus, IBM’s portfolio of patents would not constitute 
a security until sold or licensed to another company. 
Courts use the Howey test as the generally accepted starting 
point to determine whether an arrangement constitutes the sale of a 
security. In Howey, purchasers bought an interest in land, coupled 
with a contract for development of that land to grow oranges.85 In 
exchange, the investors were entitled to a portion of the profits from 
the sale of oranges.86 The Supreme Court held that this was an 
investment contract within the 1933 Act: 
The respondent companies are offering something more than fee 
simple interests in land, something different from a farm or orchard 
coupled with management services. They are offering an 
opportunity to contribute money and to share in the profits of a 
large citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly owned by 
respondents.87 
The Court identified the factors that define such a contract: (1) 
an investment of money with the expectation of profit, (2) in a 
 
 81. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).  
 82. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[F]orm should be disregarded for 
substance and emphasis should be on economic reality.”); see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. 
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (refusing to find that shares of stock entitling the holder to 
lease apartments are securities merely because the interest was called “stock”). 
 83. John G. Sobieski, What is a Security?, 25 MERCER L. REV. 381, 385 (1974).  
 84. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.6 (6th ed. 2009) 
(“The first difference is that securities are created rather than produced. Securities can be issued 
in unlimited amounts and virtually without any costs since securities are nothing in themselves 
but rather represent only an interest in something else. Therefore, an important focus of 
securities regulation is assuring that when securities are created and offered to the public, 
investors have an accurate idea of what that ‘something else’ is and how much of an interest in 
that ‘something else’ the security in question represents.”). 
 85. Howey, 328 U.S. at 295–97. 
 86. Id. at 296. 
 87. Id. at 299. 
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common enterprise, (3) coming solely from the efforts of a promoter 
or third party.88 However, the fact that patents might have intrinsic 
value themselves does not appear to be an impediment to treating 
their sale as securities, as the Court noted: “If [the investment 
contract] test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the enterprise is 
speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of property 
with or without intrinsic value.”89 
Patent portfolio transactions appear to satisfy the test, though 
individual patent transactions do not. The overarching theme is that 
patent portfolios are different from nonsecurity investment purchases 
(like precious minerals) for two primary reasons. First, they are part 
of a common enterprise: everyone buys and licenses the same 
portfolio, not different ones. Second, the value of each portfolio is 
determined in large part by the actions of a seller or licensor. The 
following subsections apply the Howey framework to patents. 
1. Investment of Money with the Expectation of Profit.  The 
Howey test requires that securities involve an investment of money 
with the expectation of profit. Because the purchase of patents and 
patent portfolios involve payments, it may seem obvious that there is 
an investment of money, but such an analysis would be deceptively 
simple. Typically, purchase of an asset for use is not considered an 
investment: “By contrast, when a purchaser is motivated by a desire 
to use or consume the item purchased—‘to occupy the land or to 
develop it themselves,’ . . .—the securities laws do not apply.”90 
Thus, in holding that “shares” in a cooperative housing 
development were not securities, the Court recognized what was 
missing: 
[T]he right to receive ‘dividends contingent upon an apportionment 
of profits.’ Nor do they possess the other characteristics traditionally 
associated with stock: they are not negotiable; they cannot be 
pledged or hypothecated; they confer no voting rights in proportion 
to the number of shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value. 
In short, the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire 
subsidized low-cost living space; it was not to invest for profit.91 
 
 88. Id. at 299–300. 
 89. Id. at 301. 
 90. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852–53 (1975) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 300). 
 91. Id. at 851 (citation omitted) (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967)). 
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But patents are different. They are negotiable, even if not in the 
Uniform Commercial Code sense. At the very least, they are 
alienable and might be pledged and hypothecated. They can 
appreciate in value as they are litigated and defended from attack. 
Thus, patents are a strange mix of use and investment. 
Technically, the patent itself provides no right to use any technology. 
Rather, it only allows the right to exclude others from practicing the 
patent.92 Even if every competitor were excluded from infringing the 
patent, the patent holder might still be barred by others who own 
competing patents on the same technology. Viewed this way, a patent 
can never be for personal use, but only for the value obtained by 
excluding others—an investment. 
In short, the inducement to purchase a portfolio will often be 
expected profits. As a result, Howey’s profit expectation will most 
likely be satisfied for patent buyers, and especially for aggregators, 
who have no reason to purchase patents but for profit. 
Similarly, patent holders may find financial investors who 
contribute money toward the purchase and/or enforcement of 
patents, but who do not obtain any license or ownership of the patent 
portfolio. If these investors purchased stock in a company or 
membership in an LLC, then they would surely qualify as securities 
purchasers. The same should be true even if there is no formal 
organization associated with the investment; the form of the 
investment may differ, but the profit expectation associated with the 
financial contribution is the same. 
On the other hand, when parties merely license a portfolio from 
the owner (rather than purchase or finance it), a more difficult 
question of investment arises. After all, one infringes a patent by 
“using” the invention93 and, as a result, licensors often grant licensees 
the right to use the invention. As discussed below, to avoid patent 
misuse allegations, when aggregators license large portfolios, they 
license the right to future use of the patent rather than simply release 
past infringement.94 Thus, facially, licensees might be considered 
patent “users” rather than “investors.” 
 
 92. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, 
or sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . during the term of the patent . . . 
infringes the patent.”). 
 93. Id.  
 94. See infra Section III.B.2. 
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However, property theory implies that a license is a type of 
ownership interest, rather than simply a contract.95 Further, economic 
reality implies that licensees may also invest with a profit expectation. 
In the rare but easy case, the value of a license will be predicated on 
the sales efforts of others, like a franchise agreement. When the 
license is predicated on the sales efforts of others, it is more likely to 
be considered a security.96 After all, the licensee intends to profit on 
the sales of a patented product. 
The more common case—litigation settlement or avoidance—
still has a profit motive, even though the licensee is paying money 
with no expectation of a future return payment by the patent owner. 
The profit from the payment is the license itself—the use of the 
patented invention. If the patent is invalidated, the license turns out 
to be worthless. 
A license fee—especially an up-front fee—is a payment made to 
fund a patent-holder’s business, even if the patent is later found 
invalid or noninfringed. Thus, there is a risk that a licensee will 
overpay for an unnecessary license. Though licensees need not pay 
future license fees after a patent is invalidated, neither are they 
entitled to a refund of past fees paid—fees that need not have been 
paid in the first place because the license benefit was illusory.97 
To the extent that patent settlements are viewed as nuisance 
payments, this might not be much of a concern. After all, a license 
buys peace, not use of the “worthless” patent. But even a nuisance 
payment gives a licensee an edge against competitors who refuse to 
make such payments. Whereas a licensee may continue doing 
business in peace, the competitors must spend time and money 
defending a patent-infringement case, with the risk of damages in a 
loss. This benefit disappears if a licensed patent is invalidated. 
 
 95. See Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not a “Contract Not To Sue”: Disentangling 
Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1101, 1141–42 (“[T]he 
basic building block of all license interests—the use-privilege—is not a contractual duty, but a 
property interest conveyed in exactly the same manner used in the realm of tangible 
property.”). 
 96. See SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 524 F. Supp. 866, 877–78 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(holding that patent licenses were securities in which sales of patented goods were performed by 
third parties other than the licensee). 
 97. Cf. George D. Kappus Jr., The Franchise as a Security: Application of the Securities 
Laws to Owner-Operated Franchise, 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 228, 237 (1970) (“After the 
franchise is in operation, the franchisee’s control over his property is illusory, and thus the profit 
of the franchise depends upon the efforts of the franchisor.”). 
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This effect may also be reversed. If a licensor obtains one 
licensee, but fails to seek licenses from the licensee’s competitors, 
then the licensee’s investment might be less valuable. The licensee’s 
costs have increased when others’ have not. This relates to efforts of 
the licensor, as discussed in more detail below. 
Courts may not be receptive to these arguments of “negative” 
profits associated with licensing. For example, the Supreme Court 
was skeptical of treating tax deductions and rental rate discounts as 
profits.98 On the other hand, some cases have held that fluctuation in 
value or loss of investment might be considered an investment for 
profit.99 The court in SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.100 summarized this 
issue nicely: 
The Court’s general principle we think, is only that the expected 
profits must, in conformity with ordinary usage, be in the form of a 
financial return on the investment, not in the form of consumption. 
This principle distinguishes between buying a note secured by a car 
and buying the car itself.101 
The question remains whether a patent or a patent license is 
more like the car or the note secured by the car. As in Life Partners, 
the purchase of a patent for aggregation must surely be considered a 
purchase for return on investment rather than current consumption. 
Companies are not buying patents in bulk for their individual value. 
A portfolio license is a more difficult case, but may also satisfy the 
investment-return test. Applied to a hybrid arrangement, in which 
others provide funds to pursue patent-infringement cases brought by 
the patent holder, such pooling might be considered a security.102 
 
 98. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855–56 (1979). 
 99. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004) (“Thus, when we held that ‘profits’ must 
‘come solely from the efforts of others,’ we were speaking of the profits that investors seek on 
their investment, not the profits of the scheme in which they invest. We used ‘profits’ in the 
sense of income or return, to include, for example, dividends, other periodic payments, or the 
increased value of the investment.” (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 
(1946))); Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Expectation of profit 
carries with it a connotation of potential appreciation or depreciation in value of the investment 
contract. That is, the arrangement must be so structured as to contemplate at the outset, some 
risk—either that the investor could lose his investment, or that the value of his return could 
fluctuate.”). 
 100. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
 101. Id. at 543. 
 102. See B.J. Tannenbaum, Jr., SEC No-Action Letter, [1986] Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 2975 
(Dec. 4, 1986). 
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2. Common Enterprise.  The Howey test next requires a common 
enterprise. When determining whether an investment scheme is a 
security, courts also look to the “promoter” and the “investor.”103 The 
promoter seeks money from the investor in a common enterprise in 
exchange for some future payout. Courts look to two different types 
of common enterprise: horizontal and vertical commonality. 
Horizontal commonality is best demonstrated by typical 
company stock. Many people own a piece of a single asset, and profits 
in the underlying asset are distributed based on share of ownership.104 
Assets with horizontal commonality are almost always considered a 
security if the other requirements are met. 
Vertical commonality is less stringent; it requires only that the 
profits of the investor are tied to the fortunes of the promoter.105 With 
vertical commonality, courts have split on how closely the fortunes 
must be tied. Some courts require strict correlation, whereby the 
profits of the investor match the profits of the promoter.106 This view 
appears to have been largely rejected. Most courts now require only a 
loose link, such that the investor can make some money even if the 
promoter makes much more.107 Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that a 
payphone lease contract was a security, even though the investor was 
promised a fixed return.108 
Prediction markets, in which people bet on the outcomes of 
events that they do not control, like elections or the Academy 
Awards, are the loosest of vertical enterprises.109 Indeed, the payout 
has nothing to do with the promoter, and is related only to a third-
 
 103. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300 (“Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are 
present here. The investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the 
promoters manage, control and operate the enterprise.”). 
 104. Rodney L. Moore, Defining an “Investment Contract”: The Commonality Requirement 
of the Howey Test, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1062 (1986). 
 105. Id. at 1065. 
 106. See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Here, strong efforts by 
Bache will not guarantee a return nor will Bache’s success necessarily mean a corresponding 
success for Brodt.”).  
 107. See Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 141 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Rather, the necessary 
interdependence may be demonstrated by the investors’ collective reliance on the promoter’s 
expertise even where the promoter receives only a flat fee or commission rather than a share in 
the profits of the venture.”).  
 108. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 397 (2004) (“The fact that investors have bargained 
for a return on their investment does not mean that the return is not also expected to come 
solely from the efforts of others.”). 
 109. See Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2004, 
at 107, 110–11. 
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party outcome. If such an outcome is an election, the underlying 
“asset” is likely a product that is regulated as a commodity; however, 
if the underlying prediction constitutes earnings in a company, the 
prediction market may constitute a security.110 
To the extent that courts accept loose vertical commonality, 
patent sales are more likely to be considered investment contracts.111 
Work by the patent seller will determine the patent’s validity and 
scope, and that work will affect the value to the downstream buyer. 
As discussed below, a court must accept a view of securities in which 
the seller’s work came before the sale rather than after it, but some 
case law supports this interpretation.112 Indeed, the outcome can rely 
on a third-party event—the validity of the patent. This event will 
drive the fortunes of the investor regardless of whether the 
promoter’s efforts are included, so long as the promoter provides the 
asset.113 
In contrast, a nonexclusive patent license may be more 
counterintuitively considered an investment in a common enterprise. 
Facially, a license is usually viewed as a damages payment, and there 
is no expected revenue stream from it.114 Despite appearances, 
however, the outcome and value of the license are still tied to the 
fortunes of the promoter.115 For example, if a patent is found invalid, 
then all other licensees may void their licenses and stop paying. This 
 
 110. See, e.g., George R. Neumann, CFTC No-Action Letter (June 18, 1993), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/files/foia/repfoia/foirf0503b004.pdf; see also Tom W. Bell, Prediction 
Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 37, 
78 (2006) (arguing that prediction markets are not securities in part because they pit traders 
against each other, rather than in a common enterprise to amass investment).  
 111. See, e.g., SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288, 1291–92 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975) (holding that there was commonality when the promoters used their expertise to find rare 
coins to be purchased by investors). 
 112. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 113. See Caldwell v. State, 95 S.W.3d 563,568 (Tex. App. 2002) (“An investor in a 
commodities account who establishes that he or she relied solely on the investment advice of a 
promoter satisfies the ‘solely from the efforts of others’ requirement.”). 
 114. Patent licenses are often viewed as an alternative to (and settlement of) potential 
litigation. As such, the payments made under license agreements are an alternative to potential 
damages (and defense) payments made in litigation. See generally John Kenneth Felter & 
Samuel Brenner, Settlement Evidence and Patent Damages, TRIAL EVIDENCE (Am. Bar Ass’n), 
July 2013, at 1, available at http://www.ropesgray.com/kenfelter/~/media/Files/articles/2013/07/
ABA%20-%20TrialEvidence_ArticleReprint_FelterandBrenner.ashx. 
 115. Indeed, such payments are declared as restoring goodwill rather than as income. Tax 
Issues and Opportunities in Technology Litigation Judgments and Settlements, WNTS INSIGHTS 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers), Oct. 2, 2012, at 1, 1 (discussing treatment of damage payments as 
goodwill restoring value of damaged patent asset). 
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means that, for ongoing royalty payments, the value of the license 
increases (through avoided costs) if the profits of the promoter 
decrease. 
Furthermore, if a fixed license fee was paid and the entire 
portfolio is invalidated, then the license fee was paid in vain—the 
license is worthless. Here too, the value of the license is still tied to 
the profits of the patentee. This loose connection is still a 
commonality—even if it is reversed from usual expectations. Thus, a 
license can be a security similar to a put option, in which the value of 
the option increases as the share price decreases. 
A related issue is division of ownership. When ownership is 
undivided, there can be no common enterprise. This is one reason 
why sales of homes and businesses, even for investment, are not 
generally considered securities. For example, the 1933 Act requires 
that interests in mineral rights must be fractional undivided 
interests.116 Thus, the question is whether patent rights must be 
fractional in a common enterprise. 
If divided interest implies a security, then licenses might be 
considered a security, though outright purchases would not. This 
seems counter to the more obvious view that a portfolio sale is a 
security and a license is not. Then again, it probably strengthens the 
argument that nonexclusive licenses, though nonrivalrous, each 
constitute an interest in a common enterprise—the patent. Like 
mineral rights, if one promises benefits from the rights while another 
continues to own the interest, an investment contract is created. This 
is different from standard use assets, like a car or house, because the 
promised benefit is to be provided by the seller. 
3. From the Efforts of Others.  The Howey test’s requirement that 
investments come solely from the efforts of others has been loosened 
through the years;117 currently, most courts will accept profits made 
through the efforts of others, even if the investor has expended some 
 
 116. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (defining securities to 
include any “fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights”). 
 117. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975) (noting the 
relaxation of the requirement without ruling on same); Miriam R. Albert, The Howey Test 
Turns 64: Are the Courts Grading this Test on a Curve?, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 19 
(2011) (“Lower courts have considered whether ‘solely’ means ‘only’ in their articulation of the 
Howey test, and some courts have eased the rigidity of the need to have the profits derived 
solely from the efforts of others by including profits that come ‘primarily,’ ‘substantially,’ or 
‘predominantly’ from the efforts of others. . . . The Supreme Court itself softened its stance and 
seemingly endorsed a more relaxed standard . . . .”). 
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effort.118 There is a limit to the amount of efforts tolerated by the 
investor, of course. Franchise agreements, like locally owned 
McDonald’s or Ford dealerships, are usually not considered 
securities. They depend in large part on the operations of the 
investor, even if the promoter dictates many of the franchise terms 
(like the products, pricing, advertising, trademarks, and other 
company-wide properties).119 Thus, franchises usually fail the “from 
the efforts of others” prong because their success is based on the 
efforts of the investor. 
Based on this, a license better fits the requirement than a sale. In 
a portfolio sale, the success depends on the buyer’s enforcement 
efforts. In a portfolio license, the success depends on the seller’s 
(licensor’s) efforts to maintain validity and license to other entities. 
But even if one accepts that the efforts need not be solely from 
the efforts of others, like in a portfolio sale, it is not clear when those 
efforts must be made. Can one sell a security in which the profits are 
to come from the past efforts of the promoter? This would seem to 
best fit initial patent sales, because the original patentee performed 
the efforts necessary to make the patent valuable, such as obtaining 
the patent, convincing the patent examiner that the invention was 
novel, and disclosing any harmful prior art. Changes in patent license 
value, on the other hand, will most likely be most affected by 
activities taking place after the license investment. The patent-
holder’s aggressiveness in enforcing the patents, as well as the 
strength of its defense regarding the validity of the patents, will affect 
license value in addition to the efforts of the original inventor.120 
 
 118. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating the test as 
“predominantly” through the efforts of others); SEC v. Int’l Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 
1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that an investment contract satisfied the third prong of Howey 
where the profits were expected to arise “at least predominantly from the efforts of others”); 
Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 408 n.59 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that the investor’s 
participation in arranging financing and proximity to the “management circle” made the 
investor’s “Limited Partnership interest” an investment contract); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner 
Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that the test requires “the efforts made by 
those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial 
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise”); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690, 
693 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding that the transaction constituted an investment contract when the 
investor gave binding marketing instructions to the promoter). 
 119. See Kappus, supra note 97, at 234 (“However, in small franchises the owners and their 
families usually provide labor. Although these franchisees generally need the most protection, it 
is more difficult to apply the Supreme Court definition to this arrangement.”). 
 120. Furthermore, treating portfolios as securities might create a fiduciary duty to increase 
license value just as company management owes to shareholders. See Stephen Bainbridge, Case 
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The courts are split. Some hold that prior efforts do not create a 
security, whereas others hold that prior efforts are sufficient to satisfy 
the statutory definition. In one case, the court held that work to find 
silver investments and an offer to store silver purchased by investors 
did not constitute a security because the efforts of the promoter 
(identification of the silver) came before the sale of the asset, and the 
storage was simply a ministerial act.121 Another case focused on post-
sale efforts; the selection of real estate for sale was considered a sale 
of securities because the individual sales were coupled with promises 
to develop the lots after the investment.122 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit made a similar ruling 
in Life Partners.123 There, the alleged security was a viatical 
settlement—a life insurance policy purchased for a terminally ill 
patient. The court ruled that because the selection of patients and 
policies occurred before others invested, such settlements could not 
be securities.124 Instead, any failure in the selection would be solved by 
common-law measures because the securities laws are not intended to 
cure all fraud, but rather only that fraud relating to future efforts of 
promoters and others.125 
Although this line of cases is well within the bounds of reason, it 
seems slightly out of step with the current application of securities 
laws.126 So many of the requirements associated with securities laws 
relate to sales of securities based on improper past actions. Reporting 
requirements involve past financial results, not future projections. 
Initial public offering documents do list future risk factors, but most 
of the disclosures relate to past and current activities.127 If those 
 
Law on the Fiduciary Duty of Director To Maximize the Wealth of Corporate Shareholders, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5, 2012), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professor
bainbridgecom/2012/05/case-law-on-the-fiduciary-duty-of-directors-to-maximize-the-wealth-of-
corporate-shareholders.html. However, operation of such a duty is ambiguous; in some cases 
license value might be maximized by invalidation of the patent. It is unlikely that courts will 
impose fiduciary duties in such cases. 
 121. Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79–80 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 122. McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975). 
 123. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 547–48. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 548. 
 126. According to one reviewer, more than one hundred articles have opined about whether 
viatical settlements are securities. Albert, supra note 117, at 22 n.105. Seventeen states have now 
amended their securities laws to explicitly include viatical settlements as securities. Id. at 32–33. 
 127. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 7, 10, Sched. A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j, 77aa (2012) (listing 
information to be disclosed in a registration statement and prospectus, including balance sheets, 
profit and loss statements, and past contracts). 
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disclosures are false, it is considered fraud. Stock fraud almost always 
relates to some event that occurs prior to a sale. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that there can be no cause of action if one did not 
actually buy or sell a security in reliance on a misstatement; simply 
holding on to a security that falls in value is insufficient.128 These rules 
imply that past efforts must have some influence on the profits or 
value of an investment. Otherwise, why should they matter? Do we 
really expect that purchasers will have a better ability to evaluate past 
actions than current and future actions? 
These concerns led to a division in the courts. More recent 
decisions have held that preinvestment efforts satisfy the Howey 
test.129 For example, at least one federal court of appeals has ruled 
that viatical settlements are, in fact, securities.130 There, the court 
rejected the test in Life Partners: 
  While it may be true that the ‘solely on the efforts of the 
promoter or a third party’ prong of the Howey test is more easily 
satisfied by post-purchase activities, there is no basis for excluding 
pre-purchase managerial activities from the analysis. . . . Courts have 
found investment contracts in which significant efforts included the 
pre-purchase exercise of expertise by promoters in selecting or 
negotiating the price of an asset in which investors would acquire an 
interest.131 
A vast majority of state courts have agreed, and treat viatical 
investments as securities.132 
Thus, a key “efforts of others” issue is how much control the 
seller has in determining patent portfolio value. Arguably, if the 
buyer maintains all control, then the sale would not be a security.133 
On the other hand, the fact that the buyer is participating in the 
 
 128. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975).  
 129. See, e.g., Wuliger v. Eberle, 414 F. Supp. 2d 814, 819–21 (N.D. Ohio 2006); SEC v. 
Tyler, No. 3:03-CV-0282-P, 2002 WL 32538418, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2002); see also SEC v. 
Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288, 1291–92 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that the 
sale of coins based on expertise exercised before purchase is a security). 
 130. SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 745 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 131. Id. at 743–44.  
 132. Joseph J. Rotunda & Mogey Lovelle, From Stocks and Bonds Through Betting on 
Death: The Applicability of Securities Laws and the Regulation of New and Creative Investments, 
THE ADVOC., Summer 2012, at 58, 60. 
 133. Cf. State v. Heath, 153 S.E. 855, 858 (N.C. 1930) (holding that an exclusive copyright 
license was not a security when the licensee had control over the exploitation of the copyrighted 
work); State v. Williams, 563 P.2d 1270, 1271–72 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a 
fractional ownership interest in a patent is a security because of its small size).  
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exploitation may be irrelevant to the determination of patents as a 
security.134 After all, the validity of the patent and its general 
application (the breadth of the claims) lie within the control of the 
seller, even if that control was exercised presale. If the seller 
maintains control over the key issues of validity, the buyer’s 
participation in asserting the patent for infringement would be 
relevant not to whether the patent was a security, but instead to 
whether the patent was offered to the public or sold in a private 
placement. 
Finally, the seller maintains control over whom it approaches for 
licenses. The value of one licensee’s purchase will be affected by 
which of the licensee’s competitors face enforcement, which 
competitors enter into license agreements, and which competitors are 
left alone.135 All of these choices are in the seller’s control—post 
sale—not the buyer’s control. In fact, the “effort of others” prong is 
more closely met in the licensing scenario. There, the seller remains 
in the picture, obtaining other licensees, defending the patents, and so 
forth. In the portfolio-sale scenario, the seller exits the picture, and is 
no longer involved with the ongoing enterprise. This implies that 
licenses more closely behave like securities than sales do. 
D. Licenses and Risk Capital 
If it seems odd that a license might be considered a security, 
there is judicial precedent supporting this proposition. In Silver Hills 
Country Club v. Sobieski,136 the California Supreme Court ruled that a 
nonownership license to use a country club, despite the payment of 
monthly dues,137 constituted a security. As the court there noted: 
Petitioners are soliciting the risk capital with which to develop a 
business for profit. . . . [Section 25008 of the California Corporations 
 
 134. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding 
that an investment in a plan that required active sales efforts of the buyer was a security and 
noting that “the word ‘solely’ should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition 
of an investment contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include within the 
definition those schemes which involve in substance, if not form, securities”); Brigadoon Scotch, 
388 F. Supp. at 1291–92 (holding that sale of coins constituted a security even though the buyer 
held the investment asset, coins, after purchase). 
 135. See Charles W. Shifley, Industry Perspectives on Patent Damages Including the 
Damages Component of Settlement Negotiations, A.B.A, http://www.ftp.abanet.org/litigation/
committees/intellectual/articles.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2013) (discussing the “greater interest 
of industry defendants to have parity with their competitors than in their absolute costs”). 
 136. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961). 
 137. Id. at 906–07. 
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Code, which defines the term “security,”] is as clearly applicable to 
the sale of promotional memberships in the present case as it would 
be had the purchasers expected their return in some such familiar 
form as dividends.138 
The Silver Hills Country Club case adopted what is now a well-
recognized, though not universally used, test: the “risk capital” test.139 
The test asks whether there is a risk that the original payment will not 
be realized in a benefit from the venture.140 As the court noted, “The 
purchaser’s risk is not lessened merely because the interest he 
purchases is labelled [sic] a membership. Only because he risks his 
capital along with other purchasers can there be any chance that the 
benefits of club membership will materialize.”141 
The risk-capital test is not widely used in federal courts. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has rejected it.142 However, it is a used by some 
state courts, often in conjunction with the Howey test.143 As such, it 
provides an analytical framework that supplements the Howey test.144 
This framework aids how one might assess patents as securities. 
Applied to patent purchasing, the risk capital is for the purchase of a 
risky asset.145 The purchase price—and any royalties—are at risk 
 
 138. Id. at 908–09. 
 139. Dennis S. Corgill, Securities as Investments at Risk, 67 TUL. L. REV. 861, 868 (1993). 
 140. See id. at 815 (“It bears noting that the act extends even to transactions where capital is 
placed without expectation of any material benefits. . . . Since the act does not make profit to 
the supplier of capital the test of what is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective 
is to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in 
legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or 
another.”) 
 141. Silver Hills Country Club, 361 P.2d at 908; see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 
56, 66–67 (1990) (discussing the family-resemblance test and an examination of motivations, 
expectations, and distribution plans). 
 142. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 n.24 (1975).   
 143. See JOSEPH C. LONG, 12 BLUE SKY LAW §§ 2:80, 2:86 (2012) (describing the use of the 
risk-capital test in California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, Oregon, Tennessee, 
Washington and other states).  
 144. See id.; see also SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393–94 (2004) (explaining that the 
Howey test is derived from state securities laws). 
 145. See United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1962) (holding that the sale of 
interest in profits from a patent is a security); People v. Shafer, 19 P.2d 861, 862 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1933) (holding that the sale of the right “to participate to the amount of his or her interest 
in any future enterprises of any nature whatever which may grow out of or arise from said 
invention or any letters patent which may be issued thereon” constituted a security under 
California law). But see Schmoyer v. Van Hosen, 208 P. 554, 557 (Kan. 1922) (“If the purpose 
[of the Kansas Blue Sky law] had been to require a permit for the sale of patent rights of a 
speculative character we think it would have been indicated expressly or by clearer implication 
than we find in the present statute.”). 
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should the patent be invalidated or noninfringed.146 With respect to 
licenses rather than purchases, the license fee might be considered an 
up-front payment to use a patent and that payment becomes 
worthless if the patent is invalid. Thus, the licensee faces the risk that 
its competitors will not have to pay a similar fee to practice the 
patent, and that its license fee did not really buy anything, given that 
the patent is no longer valid. Further, the portfolio’s value is largely in 
the hands of the seller, which separates patent portfolios from other 
speculative purchases. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF PATENT-PORTFOLIO SECURITIES 
Treating patent portfolios like securities will lead to two primary 
changes in how we think about patent transactions. First, the 
securities laws will apply to patent transactions to increase market 
integrity. Thus, transactions must be exempted from the rules, or else 
be subject to registration rules. It turns out that most transactions 
likely will be exempt, but some transactions—the ones most needing 
regulatory protection—will fall under the registration requirements. 
Furthermore, securities laws bring fraud rules, even for exempt 
transactions, and those rules will protect portfolio buyers and 
licensees. This Article considers federal laws only, although state 
securities laws might also apply. 
Second, securities treatment might spur improved pricing 
methods to aid market transactions. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act147 (Dodd-Frank Act) requires 
that certain private transactions be reported in clearinghouses; even if 
the transactions are exempt from registration requirements, public 
knowledge of licenses will have future negotiation and price setting. 
Taking this a step further, treating patent portfolios as securities will 
help focus participants on the development of objective and efficient 
pricing strategies rather than on individual patent validity. 
 
 146. See, e.g., Kemmerer v. Weaver, 445 F.2d 76, 79 (7th Cir. 1971) (“The whole underlying 
format of the arrangement was that the purchaser of individual beavers was to put up the money 
and then ‘sit back and let nature take its course’ or, more precisely, to ‘let things ride while (his) 
herd builds up and up and up’, hoping ultimately to ‘sell the herd (or part of it), bank the profits 
and enjoy long-term capital gains.’”). The court in Kemmerer held that the sale of beavers was a 
security. Id. But see Copeland v. Hill, 680 F. Supp. 466, 469 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding that the 
sale of rare coins was not a security). 
 147. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
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A. Market Integrity 
If patent portfolios are securities, then their purchase and sale 
should be regulated like other securities. This implicates several key 
aspects of securities regulation related to disclosure and market 
integrity. 
1. Public and Exempt Offerings.  In general, securities must not 
be sold to the public unless they are registered with the SEC,148 an 
expensive and time-consuming process. Furthermore, public sale 
requires public reporting of revenues and expenses associated with 
the security,149 something that many patent aggregators may be 
unhappy to do. On the other hand, such reporting would likely aid in 
setting efficient pricing, as discussed in the next subsection. Even with 
the benefits of reporting, however, if every portfolio required 
registration, many efficiency benefits of securities treatment might be 
lost. 
In the alternative, some sales are exempt from the registration 
requirement. The remainder of this subsection discusses the available 
exemptions. Most portfolio transactions will fall under an exemption, 
though a few will not. An exemption would maintain fraud and 
transparency benefits discussed below, but might avoid the costs of 
registration. 
a. Purely Private Transactions.  Sales that are purely private are 
exempt.150 Most portfolio transactions will likely fall under this 
exemption. Sales and licenses usually occur in private, between two 
companies, with a very small group of sophisticated potential buyers 
and licensees. Even so, such sales may require steps to ensure that the 
transaction remains private.151  
 
 148. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). 
 149. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12, 13, 14 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78m, 78n (2012). 
 150. Securities Act of 1933 §4(a)(2) (exempting “transactions by an issuer not involving any 
public offering”). 
 151. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125–27 (1953) (holding that exemption 
depends in part on investor sophistication and information); E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, 18 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 171, 172 (Jan. 31, 1986) (noting that the existence of 
prior substantive relationships with offerees is a factor in evaluating whether a general 
solicitation has occurred); Use of Legends and Stop-Transfer Instructions as Evidence of Non-
Public Offering, Securities Act Release No. 33-5121, 36 Fed. Reg. 1525 (Dec. 30, 1970) (noting 
that the existence of an appropriate legend or stop-transfer instructions is a factor to be 
considered in determining whether to grant an exemption); Letter of General Counsel, 
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There are a few exceptions, however, that might push the 
envelope. For example, a portfolio holder might send demand letters 
to one thousand or ten thousand potential licensees.152 Such a letter 
might be considered a public offer,153 and thus require registration. 
Furthermore, the letter would likely be a public solicitation, which 
violates SEC rules.154 
An alternate view is that such letters are not offers at all. The 
letters might instead be considered settlement demands. The 
“nonoffer” view would likely gain little traction. First, because patent 
holders want to avoid declaratory-relief actions, the language of such 
letters would almost certainly be framed in terms of a voluntary 
license, not a demand.155 Second, the law looks to the substantive 
relationship between the parties, not the form of the offer.156 As such, 
sending many letters would likely be considered a “general 
solicitation,” and thus a public offer. 
It turns out that treating mass demand letters as a public offer is 
a surprising benefit of treating portfolios as securities. Recently, small 
companies (and others) have become concerned with receiving 
demand letters sent to the masses.157 Commentators worry that such 
demand letters take advantage of unsophisticated recipients who do 
not know enough about the patents to evaluate risk or fairly 
negotiate.158 
 
Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10953 (Jan. 24, 1935) (explaining the importance of 
an issuer’s selection of and relationship with offerees). 
 152. See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000—for Using Scanners, ARS TECHNICA 
(Jan. 2, 2013, 9:30 AM) http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-
using-scanners (describing one particular entity that sent out “hundreds, if not thousands, of 
copies of the same demand letter to small businesses”). 
 153. See SEC v. Tecumseh Holdings Corp., No. 03 Civ. 5490(SAS), 2009 WL 4975263, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that an offeror’s nationwide cold-calling campaign was a general form 
of solicitation that precluded exceptions under Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–508 (2003)). 
 154. Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 723, 726, 734 (Minn. 2008) (recalling that a 
posting on the Internet constituted general advertising and solicitation). 
 155. Kristin Johnson Doyle, Patent Demand Letters: Avoiding Declaratory Judgment 
Jurisdiction, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Feb. 2010, at 30, available at http://www.iptoday.com/issues/
2010/02/patent-demand-letters-avoiding-declaratory-judgment-jurisdiction-part-2-2.asp.  
 156. E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 18 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) at 172 
(“Substantive relationships may be established with persons who have provided satisfactory 
responses to questionnaires that provide Hutton with sufficient information to evaluate the 
prospective offerees’ sophistication and financial circumstances.”). 
 157. Mullin, supra note 152. 
 158. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 22, at 1 (“Small companies and startups are more vulnerable 
to failure than large, well-established companies, and the implications of this vulnerability as it 
relates to patent demands are not well understood.”). 
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Thus, treating mass demand letters as public offerings would 
offer two benefits. First, the cost of registration with the SEC might 
dissuade some portfolio holders from sending a demand letter, thus 
limiting the deleterious effect of such demands.159 Second, to the 
extent that such demands are the most expedient way to enforce the 
patent, registration would require public disclosure regarding the 
portfolio, including any challenges to the patents and any prior 
licenses that might shed light on future license fees. An unfortunate 
side effect of this information forcing, though, would be increased 
costs passed on to licensees. Even so, the additional information and 
disincentive to register in the first place may justify the registration 
requirement. 
But not all solicitations made to the public are public offerings.160 
Courts have held that private transactions can remain exempt, even if 
they are initiated through public methods such as advertisement or 
cold calling.161 The seller helps itself when it takes steps to ensure that 
potential buyers would qualify as buyers with sufficient information 
and sophistication.162 Because most portfolio purchasers and licensors 
would qualify, most offers will still fall under the nonpublic 
exemption. 
Further, SEC Rules were recently amended to make public 
solicitation of private sales much easier. They allow for unlimited 
sales to wealthy investors, even if nonqualifying investors were 
recipients of public offers.163 In fact, this amendment may potentially 
 
 159. Portfolio owners would not be left without a remedy. They could sue sellers of the 
products that enable end users to infringe. See 35 U.S.C. §271(c) (2006) (defining contributory 
liability to include providing components of infringing product). One concern with mass 
demand letters is that they bypass the lowest cost defendant in the chain: the intermediate 
enabler. 
 160. See Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Two of the criteria for 
determining if a transaction is public are the size of the offering and the number of offerees.”). 
 161. ESI Montgomery Cnty., Inc. v. Montenay Int’l Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Whether an offering is public within the meaning of the 1933 act depends on 
‘(1) the number of offerees; (2) the sophistication of the offerees, including their access to the 
type of information that would be contained in a registration statement; and (3) the manner of 
the offering.’” (quoting United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1993))). 
 162. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.25 
(6th ed. 2009) (“The safe harbor protection, thus, is no longer dependent upon the issuer being 
able to prove that each offeree was qualified. On the other hand, if the issuer cannot show that it 
took adequate precautions against the solicitation of nonqualified offerees, it may lose the 
section 4(2) exemption because of the inability to show that a general solicitation did not take 
place.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 163. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013); Benjamin G. Lombard, United States: SEC Eliminates 
Prohibition Against General Solicitation in Rule 506 Offerings and Adopts Rule Disqualifying 
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eliminate the need for registration of initial public offerings before 
public offers are made.164 
Consider, for example, Kodak’s recent bankruptcy auction of its 
patent portfolio.165 The offer came from the court; as such, it was 
widely reported and surely a public offer designed to obtain the 
largest bid possible. In reality, however, very few companies were 
going to pay the multibillion-dollar price that Kodak expected to 
receive for its patents.166 In this sense, the offer was not really public. 
It was designed to only attract those buyers that would otherwise be 
exempt. Thus, even public announcements of portfolio sales might 
not really be public offerings, and thus the concerns of the 1933 Act 
do not really apply to such transactions. Indeed, under the new rules, 
they would be exempt without question if the buyers qualified. 
As discussed in the next sections, most parties will also fall into 
safe harbors that allow for sales even to nonwealthy licensees and 
purchasers. 
b. Underwriters and Dealers.  There are fewer restrictions for 
securities transactions on those who did not issue the security.167 In 
other words, those who buy stock may usually resell it,168 provided 
 
Bad Actors from Rule 506 Offerings, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/252122/
Securities/SEC+Eliminates+Prohibition+Against+General+Solicitation+In+Rule+506+Offering
s+And+Adopts+Rule+Disqualifying+Bad+Actors+From+Rule+506+Offerings (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2013). 
 164. Christine Hurt, More on General Solicitation: The Death of the IPO?, THE 
CONGLOMERATE (July 16, 2013), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2013/07/more-on-general-
solicitation-the-death-of-the-ipo.html (“Company B can purchase billboards, taxi signs, 
sandwich boards, Facebook ads, or even send an email to every person on earth. The catch is 
that it can accept offers to buy only from accredited investors.”). 
 165. David McLaughlin, Apple, Google Deal for Kodak Patents Approved by Judge, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-11/apple-
google-deal-for-kodak-patents-approved-by-judge.html. Put aside for one moment that the 
bankruptcy court sanctioned the sale, which might change the way that exemptions are viewed. 
 166. See Debtors’ Motion For Orders (I) (A) Conditionally Authorizing the Sale of Patent 
Assets Free and Clear of Claims and Interests, (B) Establishing a Competitive Bidding Process 
and (C) Approving the Notice Procedures and (II) Authorizing the Sale of Patent Assets Free 
and Clear of Claims and Interests at 10–11, In re Eastman Kodak Company, 479 B.R. 280 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12-10202 (ALG)), 2012 WL 3880042, at *22–23 (requiring as a 
condition for bidding “preliminary proof of the financial capacity of such person or entity to 
close the Sale, which may include current unaudited or verified financial statements of such 
person or entity”). 
 167. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1) (2012) (excepting 
“transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer”). 
 168. Id. 
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they are not affiliated with the issuer.169 Presumably, the original seller 
of a portfolio—that is, the first to aggregate it—would be the “issuer” 
with respect to a later buyer of the whole portfolio. Similarly, the 
aggregator would be the issuer with respect to future licensees. Thus, 
portfolio buyers and licensees could transfer their respective rights 
while remaining exempt from registration. 
However, there is an important limitation: underwriters and 
dealers, like issuers, are not exempt.170 This means that intermediary 
market makers cannot take the place of issuers to avoid registration 
requirements. An underwriter includes “any person who has 
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer 
in connection with, the distribution of any security.”171 A dealer, in 
turn, is “any person who engages either for all or part of his time, 
directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of 
offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities 
issued by another person.”172 
For example, when Microsoft purchased a portfolio of patents 
from AOL and then quickly resold half of the portfolio to 
Facebook,173 Microsoft likely fit the definition of an underwriter. It 
purchased the security with a view to distributing it to AOL, and as 
an underwriter it would lose the exemption of § 4(a)(1) and the 
exemption of § 4(a)(2) because it was not an issuer.174 
But underwriters may be even more common than suggested by 
the large Microsoft transaction. For example, any entity that 
purchases a portfolio intending to license it to other companies might 
be considered an underwriter. Consider also Ocean Tomo, a company 
that periodically conducts patent auctions and aids companies in 
monetizing their patent portfolios.175 Under the broad definition of 
dealer, Ocean Tomo’s activities render it a dealer and probably even 
an underwriter.176 Even though a dealer is exempt much of the time,177 
 
 169. SEC Rules 144 and 144A detail some exceptions to this rule. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144, 
144A (2013). 
 170. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(1). 
 171. Id. § 2(a)(11). 
 172. Id. § 2(a)(12).  
 173. See Facebook Buys AOL Patents from Microsoft in $550m Deal, supra note 53. 
 174. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 4(a)(1), (2). 
 175. About Ocean Tomo, OCEAN TOMO, http://www.oceantomo.com/about (last visited 
June 30, 2013). 
 176. It would be an underwriter if it were considered to be selling on behalf of an issuer. See 
SEC v. Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Ass’n, 120 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1941) (holding that a 
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to the extent that a dealer aids an issuer or another underwriter to 
complete a transaction, it transforms into an underwriter and loses its 
exemption.178 
Despite appearing to fail the test for a § 4(a)(1) exemption, most 
underwriter and dealer transactions will still be exempt with respect 
to patent portfolios. Courts and commentators have noted the 
existence of a so-called Section 4(1½) exemption.179 This exemption 
recognizes that underwriter transactions that would have been 
exempt under § 4(a)(2) as nonpublic offerings should also be exempt 
under § 4(a)(1).180 The language of the statute supports this policy 
somewhat. Underwriters are those who buy intending to distribute; 
distribution, in turn, is undefined in the statute, but has generally 
been interpreted to mean a public offering.181 
Most intermediated transactions will likely fall under the Section 
4(1½) exemption for the same reasons that most issuer transactions 
will be exempt. Intermediated deals are not generally offered to the 
public; they are offered privately, and fit exemption rules for size and 
sophistication of purchasers, as discussed below. The new buyer 
would be required to make exempt sales only as well.182 Practically, 
this means that auction houses would have to be selective about 
potential bidders to ensure that the transaction is exempt. 
 
company that assisted with the solicitation of an investment is an underwriter). If it merely 
assisted, then perhaps not. See In re Refco, Inc., Sec. Litig. No. 05 Civ. 9626(GEL), 2008 WL 
3843343, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“While the definition of ‘underwriter’ is indeed broad and is to 
be interpreted broadly, it must be read in relation to the underwriting function that the 
definition is intended to capture.”). 
 177. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(3). 
 178. Id. § 2(a)(11). 
 179. A Section 4(a)(1½) exemption just does not have the same panache following the 
recent addition of an “(a)” subpart in what used to be §§ 4(1) and 4(2). See Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012).  
 180. See Carl W. Schneider, Section 4(1-1/2)—Private Resales of Restricted or Control 
Securities, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 510 (1988) (“Thus, there would appear to be no reason to 
preclude an intent (or at least reservation of the right) to make further private resales by the 
initial Holder or his Purchaser, absent a pyramiding problem that results in a public offering 
from a series of purportedly integrated private sales.”). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See SEC v. Cavanagh, 1 F. Supp. 2d 337, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Accordingly, the SEC 
has noted approvingly of precautions such as placing a legend on the securities alerting the 
buyer to the restricted character of the securities.”); Schneider, supra note 180, at 510 (“In short, 
the general principles applicable to a Holder should apply to said Purchaser, with such 
Purchaser being, in essence, a new ‘Holder’ in connection with his own later section 4(1-1/2) 
sale.”). 
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Finally, if one is inclined to dismiss portfolio sales as securities, 
but accept portfolio licenses as securities, then underwriters will likely 
disappear from consideration. In such a scenario, purchases of 
portfolios would not be security transactions, so their subsequent 
licensing would be considered issuer transactions with the current 
portfolio owner as issuer. The result would be the same, of course; the 
exemption would just change from § 4(a)(1) to § 4(a)(2). 
c. Transaction Size and Investor Sophistication.  The law provides 
several safe harbors based on placements of small value or to special 
investors—whether by an issuer or underwriter.183 For example, an 
offering of less than $5,000,000 in the aggregate is exempt when made 
to investors of sufficient wealth and sophistication, called “accredited 
investors,” so long as the seller does not publicly advertise or solicit 
buyers.184 
Among other accreditation triggers, the threshold most relevant 
to this Article states that a company with $5,000,000 in assets is an 
accredited investor.185 Most companies buying patent portfolios will 
meet this rule, and many licensees will as well.186 Even if all do not, 
SEC Rules allow sales to up to thirty-five unaccredited investors, so 
long as the total aggregate offering price is under $5,000,000.187 
Further, so long as unaccredited buyers have “such knowledge and 
experience in financial and business matters that they are capable of 
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment,” the 
sale will be considered exempt under the Rule 506 safe harbor to 
§ 4(a)(2), regardless of offering size.188 
Further, the SEC allows for sales under $1,000,000 in total to be 
considered private, exempt transactions under the Rule 504 safe 
harbor to § 3(b). So long as certain additional criteria are met,189 § 4 
public offering considerations do not apply, and anyone is a potential 
purchaser. 
 
 183. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b) (allowing regulations to exempt offerings less 
than $5,000,000); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504–505 (2013) (providing safe harbors for smaller 
transactions). 
 184. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(5). 
 185. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3). 
 186. Of course, blockbuster portfolio transactions will exceed the aggregate total. 
 187. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (excluding accredited investors); id. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) 
(limiting investors to thirty-five sales). 
 188. Id. § 230.506. This assumes, of course, that all other requirements are met. 
 189. See id. § 230.504. 
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One benefit of the regulations is that sellers must give notice to 
the SEC, which creates a public record of transactions.190 Further, 
transactions relying on § 4(a)(2) are considered nonpublic, and would 
require steps to be taken so that the buyer does not transfer the 
securities except in a nonpublic transaction.191 
The small-value and accredited-investor exceptions would affect 
regulation of mass demand letters sent to small companies. Small 
end-users might not fall into an accredited exception that allows them 
to license the portfolio at a high dollar amount. This would leave the 
patent holder with five primary choices: (1) reduce the amount to fall 
under the $5,000,000 aggregate exemption, which allows for sales to 
thirty-five unaccredited investors;192 (2) reduce the amount to fall 
under the $1,000,000 aggregate exemption, which allows sales to 
unlimited unaccredited investors;193 (3) register the portfolio with the 
SEC, (4) seek licenses from larger companies that enable end-user 
infringement, or (5) sue end users for infringement.194 
Based on these options, the end result may be the same in many 
cases. However, more thought than is currently given to the process 
would be required before any transaction to ensure that the goals of 
the securities laws are in fact met: large transactions with smaller 
companies require more information disclosure. 
d. Transaction Brokers.  Even if they are involved in private or 
small transactions that are exempt under the 1933 Act, those who 
assist in portfolio transactions195 might still be regulated under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act).196 Brokers are 
defined as “any person engaged in the business of effecting 
transactions in securities for the account of others.”197 Brokers (and 
dealers within the 1934 Act198) must register with the SEC; they must 
 
 190. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(5) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §239.500. 
 191. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d). 
 192. Id. § 230.505. 
 193. Id. § 230.502(b).  
 194. Resolution of a bona fide patent dispute might be considered a private placement. 
 195. See, e.g., ICAP PATENT BROKERAGE, http://icappatentbrokerage.com (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2013); OCEAN TOMO, http://www.oceantomo.com (last visited Aug. 20, 2013). 
 196. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (2012). Section 
3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act defines exempted securities, but the only unregistered securities listed 
are those that are primarily intrastate. See id. § 3(a)(12).  
 197. Id. § 3(a)(4)(A). 
 198. The 1934 Act definition of dealer is much narrower than the 1933 Act definition and 
likely not applicable here. Compare id. § 3(a)(5)(A) (defining a dealer as “any person engaged 
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also join a self-regulatory organization that helps ensure minimum 
conduct and quality standards.199 This might even include employees 
of issuers (that is, licensing agents employed by portfolio companies), 
but the SEC provides several exemptions for employees.200 
Given that many people do this today for other securities 
trading, the requirement is likely not too onerous, and should have at 
least some benefits relating to regulation of market participants. For 
example, brokers have an independent due-diligence requirement as 
participants in exempt private transactions.201 
2. Fraud.  Even if a security is exempt from public-sale disclosure 
rules, securities law promotes information disclosure using rules that 
are currently unavailable in portfolio transactions. A primary purpose 
of the securities laws is to prevent fraud in the sale of securities.202 The 
most well-known prohibition is Rule 10b-5,203 which outlaws 
manipulative and deceptive acts, such as untrue statements of 
material fact and omissions of material facts that would negate other 
misleading facts.204 This rule would benefit potential purchasers and 
licensees.205 For example, it would make failure to disclose known 
prior art a securities violation. It would also outlaw misstatements 
about prior licenses and royalties obtained, and other statements 
about the validity of patents in the portfolio. Some might argue that it 
 
in the business of buying and selling securities . . . for [his] own account through a broker or 
otherwise”), with Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(12) (defining a dealer as 
“any person who engages . . . directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business 
of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another 
person”). 
 199. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15(a)(1), (b)(8); see id. § 15A(b)(6) (requiring, for 
example, that the “rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative 
acts and practices”). 
 200. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1 (2013). 
 201. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 10-22, REGULATORY D 
OFFERINGS: OBLIGATION OF BROKER-DEALERS TO CONDUCT REASONABLE 
INVESTIGATIONS IN REGULATION D OFFERINGS 3 (2010), available at http://www.finra.org/web/
groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p121304.pdf. 
 202. See, e.g., The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2013) (stating that one 
objective of the 1933 Act is to “prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale 
of securities”). 
 203. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  
 204. Id.  
 205. Section 11 of the 1933 Act would provide additional remedies for false statements in 
registration statements for public offerings. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k 
(2012). 
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should include disclosure of the patents in the portfolio in the first 
place.206 
These are all benefits that are not provided under current 
regulatory schemes. They are not required under patent law, nor are 
they the types of activities that are considered anticompetitive, so 
long as the patentee does not believe the patent to be invalid. 
Additionally, common-law fraud does not provide the same 
remedies. It is less stringent than securities laws.207 Also, securities 
fraud can travel with the patent, and common-law fraud cannot. In 
other words, if the original inventor committed a fraud, then 
downstream buyers could look to the inventor despite a lack of 
privity.208 
Portfolio holders looking to sell or license their patents would 
likely object to these rules. However, they might use the law to their 
advantage; if licensees believe that they are seeing all of the 
portfolio’s blemishes, they may be more willing to agree to enter 
license agreements. Thus, fraud rules can aid in market transactions. 
3. Insider Trading.  Related to reporting and fraud is insider 
trading, which is considered in some cases to also be a violation of 
Rule 10b-5.209 If the seller (or licensor) of the patent has knowledge 
about the patent that is otherwise not available to the public, then the 
 
 206. See Patterson, supra note 61, at 506–07 (“Barnes & Noble alleged that in their 
negotiations Microsoft initially refused to disclose which patents it claimed were being infringed 
unless Barnes & Noble agreed to a nondisclosure agreement. Then, when Microsoft filed a 
complaint . . . some of the patents it alleged were infringed were ones that it had not previously 
disclosed in the negotiations.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 207. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (“Indeed, an important 
purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available 
common-law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities 
industry.”); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (“[T]he 
doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed around transactions involving land and other 
tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of such intangibles as advice and securities, 
and . . . , accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in issue.”); see also 
Weston Instruments, Inc. v. Systron-Donner Corp., No. C-74-1099, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15987, at *1, *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1978) (refusing to apply securities laws to patent-related 
fraud). 
 208. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 745 (1975) (“In today’s 
universe of transactions governed by the 1934 Act, privity of dealing or even personal contact 
between potential defendant and potential plaintiff is the exception and not the rule.”); Cochran 
v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (reasoning that privity of contract was 
not required for a securities-fraud violation). Antitrust laws would be unlikely to reach an 
earlier wrongdoer as well. 
 209. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226–30 (1980). 
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seller (or licensor) would violate the law by transacting without 
disclosing that information.210 Such information might be about early 
sales of the invention, which would invalidate the patent, for 
example.211 It might also include information about past licenses, 
which would narrow the pool of potential future licensees.212 
However, this type of insider trading is only actionable if there is 
some sort of fiduciary duty owed.213 In the traditional case, employees 
owe a duty to investors, and thus may not trade on insider 
information.214 Portfolio buyers and licensees are not usually investors 
in the seller’s company. Thus, a general fiduciary duty may not apply, 
and when a license is negotiated at arm’s length, withholding of 
information may not be actionable as insider trading. Then again, 
buyers and licensees would be investors in the portfolios. As a result, 
insider-trading rules may well apply. 
B. Market Making 
Treating patent portfolios as securities might aid the formation 
of markets by encouraging market clearinghouses for previously 
secret transactions, thus further encouraging the use of objective 
criteria to price such portfolios. 
1. Exchanges.  If a market were formed to trade portfolio 
securities, it would have to register as an exchange under the 1934 
Act.215 Such marketplaces are unlikely to form, however; despite the 
 
 210. See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 857, 884 (1983) (“[S]ection 10(b) of the Security Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 
10b-5 . . . require corporate insiders and tippees either to disclose material inside information or 
to refrain from trading.”). 
 211. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011). 
 212. Roy Strom, Wi-Fi Case Sheds Light on Patent Trolls, CHICAGO LAWYER (Apr. 1, 
2013), http://chicagolawyermagazine.com/Archives/2013/04/Innovation-Patent-Trolls.aspx (“For 
one, [Cisco’s counsel] said most of the patents that Innovatio is asserting were already licensed 
by Broadcom to a host of other companies. Because he believes they were previously licensed, 
Innovatio cannot try to collect that fee again, he said.”) 
 213. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
 214. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (2013) (defining manipulative and deceptive acts to 
include “the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic 
information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed 
directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that 
issuer”).  
 215. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (2012) (providing 
that a key aspect of an “exchange” is that it brings buyers and sellers together in one 
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goal of improved transactions, the type of marketplace envisioned by 
the securities laws is unlikely given that the underlying transactions 
must necessarily relate to some invented technology.216 To the extent 
intermediaries aid transactions, they would likely do so as part of an 
over-the-counter market.217 Even if such exchanges were formed, they 
might be eligible for an exemption due to low volume.218 
This is not to say that there can never be a type of portfolio 
exchange. At least one company is already attempting to create a type 
of exchange. Intellectual Property Exchange International (IPXI) was 
established to create transparent bidding on patent portfolios.219 
Every portfolio is vetted for validity, and similar patents are grouped 
together for licensing. Forty-one companies—including product 
companies, universities, and research labs—have provided patents for 
licensing via the clearinghouse.220 Licensees may bid openly on the 
portfolio, purchasing as many “units” of use as they may need.221 
These units can also be sold on a secondary market IPXI maintains. If 
patents in the portfolio are invalidated or upheld in litigation or 
patent reexamination, then the market price may adjust to reflect 
such facts. Because the license is for a fixed and exhaustible number 
of units, the IPXI licenses are more like commodities than 
securities.222 
2. Dark Pools and Clearinghouses.  Without exchanges, patent 
portfolio trading is another form of “dark pool.” A dark pool is a 
securities trade that is not viewed by the market; though pricing may 
 
marketplace); id. § 5 (providing that it is illegal to operate an exchange without registration or 
an exemption). 
 216. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270, 1272–73 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that a computerized system was not an “exchange”).  
 217. See Therese H. Maynard, What is an “Exchange?”—Proprietary Electronic Securities 
Trading Systems and the Statutory Definition of an Exchange, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 833, 902 
(1992) (“[B]uying and selling interests meet on the exchange floor, in contrast to the [over-the-
counter] market where buy and sell offers ‘come together only through dealers who interpose 
themselves between the parties . . . .’” (quoting Bd. of Trade of Chi., 923 F.2d at 1274 (Flaum, J., 
dissenting))). 
 218. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.6a-1 (providing guidelines for filing an application for an 
“exemption from . . . registration based on limited volume”). 
 219. IPX Int’l, Presentation 2 (Nov. 14, 2012) (pitch book on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 220. Id. at 5. 
 221. Id. at 13. 
 222. See Ian McClure, The Value of IP as a Commodity, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG., 
May/June 2011, at 29, 31 (2011) (describing consumable licenses). 
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be determined by market transactions, the dark transaction is hidden 
from view.223 There are rational reasons why parties might want to 
hide transactions from the market, most notably that they do not 
want others to see their activity and drive prices up.224 Scholars have 
argued that the same activities are occurring in patent transactions.225 
If patent portfolios are treated as securities, then they might be 
regulated like dark markets, with transactions handled by a 
clearinghouse similar to those of the Dodd-Frank Act.226 Such a 
clearinghouse would have all the drawbacks of increased regulation 
of financial transactions: additional costs, regulatory oversight, loss of 
confidentiality, and other issues.227 It might, however, provide an 
important benefit: easing the creation of a patent market, in which 
patent portfolios are purchased and licensed with greater certainty 
and reduced transactions costs.228 
However, limitations on patent enforcement may create a 
potential barrier to market trading of patent portfolios. Patent law 
disallows patent licensing for invalid and/or noninfringed patents.229 
 
 223. Peter Kratz & Torsten Schoneborn, Optimal Liquidation in Dark Pools 1 (Apr. 13, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1344583##.  
 224. Robert Hatch, Reforming the Murky Depths of Wall Street: Putting the Spotlight on the 
Security and Exchange Commission’s Regulatory Proposal Concerning Dark Pools of Liquidity, 
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1034–35 (2010). 
 225. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 67 (arguing that IV has purchased and licensed 
patents using more than twelve hundred shell companies). 
 226. See Eduard H. Cadmus, Note, An Altered Derivatives Marketplace: Clearing Swaps 
Under Dodd-Frank, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 189, 213 (2012) (describing the 
requirement that swap transactions be cleared through an appropriate organization).  
 227. Interestingly, however, because portfolios themselves would be securities, they would 
not be considered “asset-backed” securities under 1933 Act registration requirements, and thus 
would avoid some more stringent reporting requirements. It is unclear whether a patent 
portfolio would meet either definition, but it would more likely meet the broader 1934 Act 
definition. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 229.1101(c) (2013) (defining “asset-backed securities” for 
Regulation AB registration), with Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(79), 15 U.S.C. §78c 
(2012) (defining “asset-backed securities” for the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 228. See Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013) (manuscript at 13), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2224305 (“In such informationally-opaque markets, spreads widen between the occasional 
trader’s buying price and another occasional trader’s selling price, with wide spreads profiting 
experienced, informed traders. . . . Because a clearinghouse with public pricing gives outsiders 
the same information as the regular traders, spreads narrow. Trading becomes less expensive.”). 
 229. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969) 
(disallowing enforcement of patents on noninfringing products); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 
29, 32–33 (1964) (“[A] patentee’s use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration 
date of the patent is unlawful per se.”). 
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As such, licensees may argue that they need not pay the “market” 
price because they only infringe some of the patents in the portfolio.230 
Technically, this is true with single-patent licenses.231 However, this 
bar may be overcome by framing portfolio licenses as right-to-use 
licenses. Right-to-use terms would state that the fair market price 
includes not only payment for infringing products, but also the right 
to create new infringing products in the future, using patented 
inventions that are not currently infringed.232 
How courts treat such terms will be critically important to 
portfolio licensing and, by extension, market formation. Licenses 
granting rights to only one or two patents have little or no value if the 
underlying patents are invalidated. Thus, right-to-use clauses will not 
be terribly helpful. 
For large portfolios, however, even if many patents expire or are 
invalidated, the portfolio remains active. Portfolio owners would 
argue that such bundling is not a sham because the licensee obtains 
value for the remaining patents.233 Some might argue that the licensing 
 
 230. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 61, at 506–07. 
 231. See Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] contract that provides 
for royalties either when a patent expires or when it fails to issue cannot be upheld unless it 
provides a discount from the alternative, patent-protected rate.”); Meehan v. PPG Indus., Inc., 
802 F.2d 881, 885–86 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Even when an inventor has not yet applied for a patent, 
the right to apply for and obtain those protections is valuable.”); Boggild v. Kenner Prods., 776 
F.2d 1315, 1319–20 (6th Cir. 1985) (explaining that a license must distinguish between patent 
and nonpatent royalties); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1371–72 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(noting that Brulotte applies to hybrid agreements); Span-Deck, Inc. v. Fab-Con, Inc., 677 F.2d 
1237, 1247 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that a hybrid license must differentiate between patent and 
nonpatent consideration); Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 139–40; cf. Aronson v. Quick Point 
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 261–62 (1979) (holding that a royalty that decreases when a patent 
does not issue is enforceable); Am. Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769, 777 
(3d Cir. 1959) (holding that package patent licensing is misuse if it is a sham). 
 232. See Hull v. Brunswick Corp., 704 F.2d 1195, 1202–03 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that the 
continuation of royalties under one patent after the expiration of a second patent is 
enforceable); cf. Zila, Inc., 502 F.3d at 1021–22 (“This understanding, however, may well 
overread both Brulotte and Aronson, by glossing over the unique and onerous contractual 
restrictions at issue in Brulotte and relying on a sentence in Aronson that is really only dicta. . . . 
In short, were we writing on a clean slate, we might be inclined to read the dicta in Aronson as 
nonbinding in light of what appears on its face to be a very limited holding in Brulotte. By doing 
so, we would largely avoid attributing to the Supreme Court in Brulotte and Aronson the lack of 
economic logic laid at its feet . . . .”). 
 233. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“[G]rouping licenses in a package allows the parties to price the package based on their 
estimate of what it is worth to practice a particular technology, which is typically much easier to 
calculate than determining the marginal benefit provided by a license to each individual 
patent.”). 
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value for noninfringed right-to-use patents must be minimal,234 but 
this is a question of pricing, as discussed below. Concerns about 
portfolio licensing are not unlike similar concerns about copyright 
package licensing. Opponents considered blanket music licenses from 
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 
(ASCAP) to be a form of price fixing, but the Supreme Court 
disagreed.235 Today, such licenses are considered not only efficient, 
but also an indispensable way to avoid ongoing conflict.236 
The rule that one may not license an invalid or noninfringed 
patent affects portfolio licensing in a few ways. First, small portfolios 
might need to be supplemented as patents are invalidated or expire to 
ensure that the number of patents in the license remains reasonable. 
This creates an incentive for portfolio owners to take up-front fees 
and to avoid supplementing, leading to a difficult choice between 
license scope and future portfolio growth. Second, portfolios must 
nominally relate to similar technology. As the type of technology 
diversifies away from one technology, the argument that a license is 
being made for a right-to-use becomes less credible. The problem is 
that a technology focus reduces the investment diversification of the 
portfolio as well. Thus, the investment becomes more subject to 
systemic risk relating to the technology. As discussed above, the goal 
of the portfolio owner is to diversify technology as much as possible 
while still attracting licensees. A legal rule that requires too much 
focus hinders that diversification. As a result, the rule creates a 
difficult choice between diversification and size. 
This particular enforcement problem only affects licensing 
markets. Patent buyers may purchase as many diverse patents as they 
wish, and place them into different licensing pools as they see fit. 
 
 234. See Patterson, supra note 61, at 510–11 (“A patentee . . . is not justified in insisting 
upon continued licensing of an invalid or non-infringed patent.”). 
 235. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1979) (holding 
that ASCAP’s blanket license was not per se illegal and remanding the case to determine 
whether the license was illegal under rule-of-reason analysis). 
 236. See id. at 20–21 (“Most users want unplanned, rapid, and indemnified access to any and 
all of the repertory of compositions, and the owners want a reliable method of collecting for the 
use of their copyrights. Individual sales transactions in this industry are quite expensive, as 
would be individual monitoring and enforcement, especially in light of the resources of single 
composers. . . . A middleman with a blanket license was an obvious necessity if the thousands of 
individual negotiations, a virtual impossibility, were to be avoided.”). But see Michael A. 
Einhorn, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in Broadcasting, 24 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 349, 350–51 (2001) (stating that concerns about anticompetitive 
licenses continue). 
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3. Security Pricing.  If portfolios are treated as securities, then 
more efficient portfolio pricing may be the most important 
requirement to reducing transactions costs and forming a market.237 
As portfolios grow, then lowering pricing costs may be preferable to 
completely accurate pricing.238 The benefits of efficient portfolio-
pricing techniques will apply even if portfolios are not securities, but 
treating portfolios as securities would hasten implementation. 
Of course, securities laws are not necessary for these pricing 
methods, but they can help. Information disclosure rules can aid in 
providing information about portfolio composition. Clearinghouses 
can provide transparency about past pricing. And, perhaps most 
importantly, a culture of trading can encourage the use of better 
pricing techniques. 
In the traditional economic analysis, efficient market prices are 
set by the intersection of those willing to pay a certain price and those 
willing to sell at a certain price. This is what we might call the fair or 
market-clearing price. Stocks are usually considered to be priced this 
way, even if the participants do not have complete information. 
Indeed, patents are often valued based on their selling prices.239 
Thus, when all the rights to a patent portfolio are sold, the 
pricing should approach what we might think of as market-clearing 
prices. Buyers and sellers will have independent, arm’s-length beliefs 
about the value of the portfolio. As such, the set price can be 
considered fair, even if the price does not reflect the “true” value of 
 
 237. See Kramer, supra note 10, at 466 (“Endeavoring to evaluate dozens or potentially 
hundreds of patents that might be relevant in a significant business decision is impractical and 
generally fails to consider the context and interactions of the market. Thus, an efficient yet 
accurate means of patent valuation is needed to facilitate the inquiry.” (footnote omitted)); 
Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 195–96 (“No agreed-upon patent valuation technique 
current exists. Consequently . . . the market remains largely inefficient, illiquid, and opaque.”); 
cf. Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Rader: “We Need To Tolerate a Little Injustice,” IPWATCHDOG 
(Oct. 4, 2011, 11:30 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/10/04/chief-judge-rader-we-need-to-
tolerate-a-little-injustice/id=19544 (debating the merits of case-by-case damages analysis versus 
efficient but potentially unjust rules of thumb). 
 238. See Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 205–06 (“[I]n the mergers and acquisitions 
context involving hundreds, if not thousands, of patents and a time constraint of two to three 
weeks to conduct due diligence, thorough claim analysis proves virtually impossible. . . . The 
inability to quickly and accurately value patents undoubtedly creates a significant challenge for 
technology-focused firms and those responsible for their patent portfolio management. One 
practitioner stated that he is fairly confident that no one has solved this problem yet, and he 
believes that companies essentially trade accuracy for speed in M&A deals involving a relatively 
large number of patents.”). 
 239. 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation § 42,044 (2013). 
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the asset. This is little different from how stocks are priced; stocks 
might be purchased for more than the company is “worth” based on 
its expected revenue streams. This is not a bug in the system, but a 
feature. Sometimes, people pay more than they should in a market 
transaction, and those who overpay might lose money when the price 
falls. 
A big difference, of course, is that licensees must purchase or 
face litigation. However, if accurate pricing methodologies are 
developed, then the tradeoff between litigation and a market-clearing 
price should be achievable. Another big difference is that portfolios 
must be priced as a whole; attempts to separately debate and price 
every patent in the portfolio will increase transaction costs and likely 
lead to failed transactions.240 
Unfortunately, full information and pricing methodologies are 
often unavailable, which creates a real problem in the market.241 
Furthermore, reforms to the litigation system to bring damages in line 
with the actual value of patents and to reduce the cost of litigation 
would be helpful. Litigation reforms are beyond the scope of this 
Article. The goal here, therefore, is to explore methods for relatively 
accurate pricing with the information available to market 
participants, regardless of what that information might be. This may 
be more possible than many think. After all, much more information 
is available about privately traded patents—for those willing to do the 
research—than about many private companies selling stock.242 
 
 240. See Patterson, supra note 61, at 508–09 (“[G]rouping licenses in a package allows the 
parties to price the package based on their estimate of what it is worth to practice a particular 
technology, which is typically much easier to calculate than determining the marginal benefit 
provided by a license to each individual patent.” (quoting U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2005))). 
 241. See Lemley & Myhrvold, supra note 3, at 257 (“Patents . . . exist in just such a blind 
market. Want to know if you are getting a good deal on a patent license or technology 
acquisition? Too bad. Even if that patent or ones like it have been licensed dozens of times 
before, the terms of those licenses, including the price itself, will almost invariably be 
confidential.”); Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 205 (“Virtually all [in-house counsel] 
interviewees lamented the fact that no coherent valuation technique exists.”); Nikolic, supra 
note 3, at 409 (“The absence of a regulated market creates a lack of liquidity, making 
investments less attractive to investors and providing less transparency for investors.”); 
Patterson, supra note 61, at 508–09 (“[I]f a patentee insists on licensing its portfolio as a whole, 
without identifying which particular patents are infringed or what the royalty for licensing them 
individually would be, a licensee is unable to make the determinations that are necessary for 
sensible decision making in the licensing process.”). 
 242. See John E. Dubiansky, An Analysis for the Valuation of Venture Capital-Funded 
Startup Firm Patents, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 170, 175 (2006) (“In fact, there is much more 
information available on patent transactions than for many other aspects of the venture capital 
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Further, if portfolios are sold in public offerings, then information 
about them would be required in a registration statement as is 
required with publicly traded stock. 
a. Pricing Based on Past Licensing.  The best way to price a 
portfolio is to use past licenses of the same patent or portfolio.243 
Absent that, licenses of comparable patents and portfolios might be 
used. However, using actual negotiated prices can be problematic. 
Such data is difficult to find because it is kept secret.244 Further, when 
licenses are made public, they often omit information.245 As patents 
become traded like commodities more often, the secrecy concern may 
diminish. That is because brokers who have experience in multiple 
licensing transactions can bring experience to bear on later 
negotiations.246 
Even armed with data, however, licenses of comparable patents 
may not be helpful.247 Use of comparable licenses assumes that similar 
patents (or even licenses of the same patent) can be treated similarly. 
This may not always be true.248 For example, the products associated 
with the patents may be priced differently, making royalties 
incomparable. 
Further, because portfolios are licensed to potential infringers, 
the portfolio owner has significantly more leverage to use against the 
licensee; the portfolio owner can sue for damages or an injunction. 
 
industry.”); Kelley, supra note 1, at 131–32 (describing the ways that patents provide 
information). 
 243. See Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 203. 
 244. Kramer, supra note 10, at 469; Lemley & Myhrvold, supra note 3, at 257. 
 245. Jonathan A. Barney, A Study of Patent Mortality Rates: Using Statistical Survival 
Analysis To Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317, 323 (2002). 
 246. See Kelley, supra note 1, at 121 (asserting that 75 percent of transactions are through 
brokers); Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 205 (“According to another practitioner, as 
brokers have done an increasing number of deals, some increasingly rely on their databases to 
set proposed prices for patents based on (1) the technology area and (2) the mean value of 
patent prices in that technology area.”). 
 247. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 61, at 2022 (arguing that royalties in publicly 
disclosed licenses are larger than royalties in general because only “material” licenses are 
reported under SEC rules), Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 202 (explaining that “identifying 
values of comparable patents sold or licensed in the market place” is not that helpful for valuing 
patents because of the “confidentiality surrounding the majority of patent transactions”). 
 248. See Kelley, supra note 1, at 130 (“Mandatory disclosure, however, is unlikely to be 
effective in reducing transaction costs in this marketplace, because it rests on the questionable 
premise that other patent transactions about which information is disclosed are readily 
‘comparable’ and therefore will reliably determine an appropriate value in a practitioner’s 
current transaction.”). 
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This leverage increases as the size of the portfolio grows.249 As such, 
negotiated payments may overstate portfolio value. 
This overstatement is mitigated by a couple of countervailing 
factors. First, potential licensees do not blindly accept arrangements. 
Instead, portfolio owners usually present the patents in the portfolio 
that they think the potential licensee most likely infringes. Indeed, a 
good portfolio will often have patents related to different 
technologies, and the licensees may not want or need all of those 
patents.250 Large corporations often do the same thing when cross-
licensing patent portfolios and the parties are negotiating a “balance 
payment,” which is the amount one party pays to the other so that 
each side contributes equal value.251 Similarly, standards-setting 
organizations require members to license the portfolio of patents 
contributed by that member.252 
Second, potential licensees can always refuse to pay for a license 
if the price is too high. Portfolio owners cannot realistically sue on 
more than a few patents at a time, and they cannot sue more than one 
defendant at a time in a single action.253 Additionally, with every 
litigated challenge, there is a risk that a patent will be invalidated, 
which may reduce the portfolio value, especially given the nonjoinder 
rules that give each defendant a defense in front of a different court. 
Thus, portfolio owners have some incentive to charge less than they 
otherwise might attempt. Of course, large portfolios make it more 
difficult to challenge any particular patent, because there are several 
more to follow even if any given patent is invalidated.254 
 
 249. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 35–36; Patterson, supra note 61, at 504. 
 250. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 41 (“One important insight into the 
dual-form benefits of patent portfolios (scale and diversity) is that substantial tension exists 
between these two goals. That is, as noted above, effective patent portfolios are both sizable—
covering an expanse of closely-related subject matter—and diverse—composed of distinct 
individual patents, thus diminishing the importance of any specific patentable subject matter. 
Yet maximizing one dimension will degrade the other.”).  
 251. See, e.g., Nilay Patel, Intel Agrees To Pay NVIDIA $1.5b in Patent License Fees, Signs 
Cross-license, ENGADGET (Jan. 10, 2011, 5:07 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2011/01/10/intel-
agrees-to-pay-nvidia-1-5b-in-patent-license-fees-signs-c. 
 252. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard 
Setting, in 1 INNOVATION, POL’Y, & ECON. 119, 128 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern 
eds., 2001). 
 253. See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2011) (limiting joinder of defendants). 
 254. See Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 
359, 386–87 (1999) (arguing that patent portfolios can shield weak patents); Jean O. Lanjouw & 
Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped? 47 
J.L. & ECON. 45, 45 (2004) (finding that firms with large portfolios litigate less than firms with 
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In any event, data is likely not available to efficiently price 
portfolios based on existing pricing. 
b. Royalty- and Cost-Stream Pricing.  Another potential pricing 
strategy stems from traditional stock pricing. Share pricing is typically 
theorized as the net present value of all the expected revenues to the 
company.255 Indeed, some have suggested a similar method to value 
patents.256 For patents, buyers would consider the stream of royalties 
they would pay or the stream of costs to defend infringement suits.257 
Though more data would be available for this pricing method, it 
also suffers from difficulties. The stream of costs would be based in 
large part on threats by the patent holder rather than the patent’s 
value. Additionally, such costs would be subject to the same 
asymmetric leverage that biases existing licenses. Even without 
leverage, the price will be different based on the potential product 
configurations of licensees. As a result, as portfolios become larger 
and more complex, defining a single valuation might be more 
difficult.258 
 
smaller portfolios); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 82 (“If the holder of a large patent 
portfolio asserts its patents against another company and claims that the other company is 
infringing dozens or even hundreds of its patents, the target company faces a very complex and 
costly undertaking if it chooses to fight all of those patent infringement claims in court, knowing 
that it has to win all or nearly all of the individual patent cases to avoid [payment] . . . .”); 
Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 66 (“Yet, in many cases, the invalidation of one of 
the patents in a portfolio might not have a dramatic effect on the overall value.”); Patterson, 
supra note 61, at 504 (discussing the competitive advantage of large portfolios due to the 
increased cost and difficulty of assessing infringement). 
 255. See Stephen P. Baginski & James M. Wahlen, Residual Income Risk, Intrinsic Values, 
and Share Prices, 78 ACCT. REV. 327, 328 (2003); cf. Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 232–33 
(suggesting a method for calculating net present value discount rate for patents). 
 256. See Robert S. Bramson, Valuing Patents, Technologies and Portfolios: Rules of Thumb, 
in HANDLING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 2001, available at 
635 PLI/PAT 465, 469–70 (1999) (valuing patents based on present value of royalties less 
litagation expenses); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 639–41 (2002) 
(presenting a model of patent value that includes expected stream of rents, including signaling 
information about the company obtaining a patent); Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 202; 
Nikolic, supra note 3, at 404 (suggesting that only patents with defined cash flow can be 
securitized). 
 257. Bramson, supra note 256, at 469–70; see also GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, 
VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS 222–24 (3d ed. 2000) 
(describing the relief from royalty approach to valuation). 
 258. See Kramer, supra note 10, at 464 (“Accurate assessment can be cumbersome in more 
complex transactions, such as significant cross licensing negotiations. Such deals can involve 
multiple patents of various magnitudes, perhaps covering disparate technologies, and sometimes 
uncertain commercial applications.”). 
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Nonetheless, pricing based on potential future royalties is 
alluring because it is based on real costs and benefits. Use of this 
method should be based in part on realistic expectations of damages 
if there were litigation.259 This implies that efficient pricing of 
securities is most likely to be achieved when there is a better 
definition of expected damages in court. If the parties cannot agree 
on a reasonable damages calculation, then they will have difficulty 
agreeing on a likely stream of such damages in case of litigation. If the 
parties can agree, they can make adjustments for the likelihood that 
at least one patent will be valid and infringed,260 which might, in turn, 
be based on the litigation history of patents in the portfolio or other 
objective indicia, discussed below.261 Further, use of the method 
should include financially sound calculations of discount rates to 
adjust expected future royalties for risk that the patent’s value will 
decrease over time.262 
Related is the option-pricing method.263 In this method, a patent 
license represents the ability to exploit the patent in the future, just as 
a stock option represents the ability to purchase a share of stock in 
the future.264 The dominant method for pricing options, the Black-
Scholes formula, considers a stock’s price volatility.265 Option pricing 
is difficult for individual patents because the volatility of a patent’s 
price is usually unknown.266 Even so, the model for pricing options 
 
 259. See Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 222 (suggesting that potential patent damages 
are the touchstone for calculating future royalty payments). 
 260. Id. at 232. 
 261. Michael J. Mazzeo, Jonathan Hillel & Samantha Zyontz, Predicting the 
“Unpredictable”: An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Patent Infringement Awards 3 (Oct. 21, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2164787 (finding that objective patent criteria predict 75 percent of infringement damages 
awards). 
 262. See, e.g., Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 223–31 (suggesting a method for 
calculating market volatility for determination of discount rate under the capital asset pricing 
model). 
 263. See generally ROBERT PITKETHLY, THE VALUATION OF PATENTS: A REVIEW OF 
PATENT VALUATION METHODS WITH CONSIDERATIONS OF OPTION BASED METHODS AND 
THE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH (1997); Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, 
Patents, Real Options, and Firm Performance, 112 ECON. J. C97 (2002). 
 264. Denton & Heald, supra note 9, at 1195. 
 265. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. 
POL. ECON. 637, 638–39 (1973); Denton & Heald, supra note 9, at 1199; Robert C. Merton, 
Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 141, 148 (1973). 
 266. Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 202. Additionally, the formula relies on some 
assumptions about stock pricing—such as a normal distribution—that may not hold true for 
patent pricing. See Denton & Heald, supra note 9, at 1203–04 (discussing difficulties of option 
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might give some clues about how to think about pricing an entire 
portfolio based on objective and observable indicators of value.267 
Some have proposed a patent valuation based on profits 
associated with manufacturing a product.268 This method, though 
reasonable, is unlikely to be applicable in the patent-securities setting 
for all but the most expansive of patents. Because most patents cover 
incremental innovation, it is rare that a patent (or even a portfolio) 
will be associated with specific profits for a unique product.269 Of 
course, pharmaceutical or pioneering mechanical patents may grant 
such rights, in which case the value of profits from the product might 
far exceed the costs of avoiding royalties or litigation costs. 
c. Objective Indicator Pricing.  Thus, it would be helpful to find a 
way to value a patent portfolio for licensing or for sale when there is 
no recent sale of similar portfolios. Ideally, such valuation would be 
based on objectively measurable criteria,270 which is contrary to how 
pricing has traditionally worked.271 Such a model must also provide 
reasonable estimates, rather than guesses.272 
 
pricing); cf. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY 
IMPROBABLE 279 (2d ed. 2007) (criticizing assumptions of the Black-Scholes pricing formula). 
 267. See, e.g., Ming-Cheng Wu & Chun-Yao Tseng, Valuation of Patent—A Real Options 
Perspective, 13 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 313, 316 (2006) (using citations as a proxy for patent 
value to calculate option price). 
 268. See, e.g., SMITH & PARR, supra note 257, at 224–27. 
 269. See Dubiansky, supra note 242, at 174 (“For an investor in a startup firm, the Relief 
from Royalty approach is more helpful because it best approximates the resale value of the 
patent. This approach analogizes the patent asset to a piece of production equipment.”).  
 270. See Denton & Heald, supra note 9, at 1177 (“We conclude that an adequate patent 
pricing metric must combine probabilistic methods familiar to experts in mathematical finance, 
quantum mechanics, and statistical climatology, with the strategic assumptions familiar to game 
theorists.”); Kelley, supra note 1, at 126 (“As such, the industry has developed multiple tools 
and rating systems, both custom and off-the-shelf, to facilitate evaluations based on [objective] 
factors.”); Kramer, supra note 10 (proposing econometric valuation of patents based on patent 
characteristics); see also, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & Derek 
R. Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 437–38 (2004) (describing criteria used to 
compare valuable patents with other patents); Maayan Filmar, An Ex Ante Method of Patent 
Valuation: Transforming Patent Quality into Patent Value, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 
2013) (manuscript at 45–52), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2252251 (describing several objective measures of patent valuation). 
 271. Landers, supra note 7, at 165 (“As a practical matter, under current patent valuation 
principles, a patent’s worth is dependent on a constellation of factors. These include the 
business context of the products that relate to the invention, the state of technological progress, 
and anticipated commercialization opportunities.”); id. at 167 (“Moreover, it is questionable 
whether patent valuation can be credibly performed without some reliance on the market as a 
touchstone.”); see also Bramson, supra note 256, at 475 (setting $5 million as the minimum value 
for any portfolio); Kelley, supra note 1, at 125 (describing claims charts as the most important 
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It may seem strange to consider the value of the portfolio when 
one cannot calculate the value of any individual patent in it. 
However, because a portfolio tends to minimize the impact of any 
one patent through the law of large numbers,273 statistical tools may 
be better at calculating the value of a portfolio than previously 
expected.274 For example, economists have been estimating the value 
of all patents in a country or technology area for some time;275 the 
same methodology might apply to large portfolios. Furthermore, 
pricing a portfolio is likely cheaper and easier than examining every 
patent in it.276 
Comparing observable information is unlikely to yield value 
information for individual patents. Two patents may have identical 
citations, but may have vastly different values based on technology 
and other, less measurable aspects of the patent. Indeed, the most 
detailed valuation studies at the individual level only rank patents in 
value as compared with others.277 On the other hand, if a general 
 
factor in valuation); Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 197 (measuring patent value based on 
“the scope of the patent’s claims . . . the products or services covered by the patent’s 
claim . . . and the economic benefit associated with the product or service”); Scott D. Phillips, 
Patent & High Technology Licensing: Evaluation of Patent Portfolios, in PATENT & HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING, available at 652 PLI/PAT 57, 67 (2001) (“What technical areas does 
the portfolio address? How much in a given subject area is covered by patent claims? What 
problems do the patents really solve? How important are the patents to others or to industry 
standards? Who else is in the field, and how significant of an industry player are they? What 
alternatives to licensing exist?”). 
 272. See, e.g., Richard A. Neifeld, A Macro-Economic Model Providing Patent Valuation 
and Patent Based Company Financial Indicators, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 211, 213 
(2001) (purporting to assign value to every U.S. patent). Neifeld’s results seem disconnected 
from reality, assigning a value of $1.6 million to a bathtub patent and $4.7 million to a clamp 
patent. These calculations seem out of touch with the nearly universal finding that most patents 
are not worth anything. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 52. 
 273. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 6 (“Rational firms will therefore 
typically seek to obtain a large quantity of related patents, rather than evaluating their 
individual worth.”). 
 274. See Kramer, supra note 10, at 467 (“The efficiency of the analytical methodology makes 
it particularly well suited to the management of patent portfolios.”). 
 275. See generally, e.g., Griliches et al., supra note 6; Mark Schankerman & Ariel Pakes, 
Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries During the Post-1950 Period, 96 
ECON. J. 1052 (1986); Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by 
Technology Field, 29 RAND J. OF ECON. 77 (1998). 
 276. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 64 (suggesting that portfolio licensing 
will reduce transaction costs in part by obviating the need to examine and/or license individual 
patents). 
 277. Allison et al., supra note 270, at 448–60; Kramer, supra note 10, at 481; Jean O. 
Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, The Quality of Ideas: Measuring Innovation with Multiple 
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model is developed that can separate valuable patents from 
nonvaluable patents, then a large portfolio can be filtered into groups 
of valuable and nonvaluable patents.278 Thus, ranking value may be 
preferable to no information at all, but such ranking may not be 
sufficient for market pricing of an individual patent.279 
i. Forward Citations.  There are a few clues that imply a patent’s 
potential worth as part of the portfolio. The first is the number of 
times the patent is cited by other patents; this is often called forward 
citations. In general, more valuable patents appear to be cited more 
than other patents.280 Furthermore, they are cited by others much 
further into the future than the average patent.281 This makes intuitive 
sense; one would expect more important patents to be cited by 
others.282 Thus, one study found that counting citations after five years 
is sufficient to measure initial expectations about a patent’s quality, 
but longer-term citations show unexpected increases in patent value 
over time (a long tail).283 One study even found (perhaps 
counterintuitively) a U-shape distribution, with value peaking and 
 
Indicators 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7345, 1999), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7345.  
 278. Piotr Masiakowski & Sunny Wang, Integration of Software Tools in Patent Analysis, 35 
WORLD PAT. INFO. 97 (2013) (describing tools for textual analysis of patent portfolios). 
 279. But see Barney, supra note 245, at 330–32. Barney uses maintenance renewal rates to 
create a range of values for all patents. He then argues that patents ranked by quality can be 
placed somewhere on that range to obtain a value. However, this method is based on some 
fairly tenuous assumptions about the distribution of patent values.  
 280. Allison, et al., supra note 270, at 455; Kramer, supra note 10, at 475–76; Lanjouw & 
Schankerman, supra note 277, at 10; see Cristina Odasso, Giuseppe Scellato & Elisa Ughetto, 
Selling Patents at Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Patent Value 15 (July 10, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript) (finding that forward citations correlate with higher auction prices), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291874. Such references should 
be normalized by the age of the patent. Kramer, supra note 10, at 485. 
 281. Kramer, supra note 10, at 478; Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, International 
Knowledge Flows: Evidence from Patent Citations 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 6507, 1999).  
 282. But see Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 203–04 (arguing that backward citations 
measure the quality of disclosure, but not the scope of claims). As discussed below, this concern 
can be addressed by considering the interaction of citations and claims. 
 283. Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 277, at 14–15; see also Bronwyn Hall, Adam Jaffe 
& Manuel Trajtenberg, Market Value and Patent Citations: A First Look, 36 RAND J. ECON. 16, 
18–19 (2005) (finding that stock market values reflect future patent citations from that time and 
thus reflect changes in patent valuation); Gregory P. Daines, Patent Citations and Licensing 
Value 60 (June 2007) (unpublished MBA thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 
available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/39530/173993864.pdf?sequence=1 
(confirming that forward citation counts contain information on the private licensing value of 
patents). 
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then receding as the number of citations increases.284 For purposes of 
valuation, however, the distribution shape is irrelevant so long as it is 
predictive of value in some sense. 
One problem with using forward citations, however, is that they 
are only telling in hindsight. Older patents will necessarily have had a 
chance to accumulate whatever citations they might garner, whereas 
newer patents are uncertain. This can have the dual effect of 
increasing pricing uncertainty of new patents as well as skewing their 
value lower. As noted above, this effect may diminish within the first 
five years, though such estimates necessarily trim the so-called long 
tail. 
ii. Backward Citations.  Another potential clue is the number of 
other patents that the patent at issue cites. This is often called 
references or backward citations. The results here are a bit murkier. 
Intuitively one would expect that the more references a patent makes, 
the more likely it is to be valid. On the other hand, patents are often 
invalidated based on nonpatent prior art, such that patent references 
are less indicative of value. Some studies have found the number of 
references to be statistically representative of value,285 but other 
measures in the same studies refute this finding.286 One study found 
that the number of references was not statistically different between 
valuable patents and the general population.287 Indeed, another study 
found that, as compared with once-litigated patents, heavily litigated 
patents are much less likely to win in court, despite having more 
references.288 This undermines the use of backward citations for 
 
 284. David S. Abrams, Ufuk Akcigit & Jillian Popadak, Understanding the Link Between 
Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Defensive Disruption? 1 (Apr. 8, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/Documents/Academic%20
Programs/Intellectual%20Property/PatCon3/abrams.pdf.  
 285. E.g. Allison et al., supra note 270, at 449, 453–55; see Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra 
note 277, at 10 (finding that references were statistically significant for all types of patents, but 
were better quality indicators for drug and chemical patents). 
 286. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 277, at 16 (finding that backward references 
did not affect the probability that maintenance fees would be paid on the patent). 
 287. Kramer, supra note 10, at 477. Kramer finds that essential patents (for technology 
standards) tend to cite newer prior art than does the average patent. Id. at 478. This cuts both 
ways. It implies, as Kramer argues, that essential patents are timelier. But it may also imply that 
such patents are more obvious. 
 288. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement 
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 681, 686–87 (2011) (noting that most-litigated 
patent plaintiffs won only 10.7 percent of suits as compared with 47.3 percent of once-litigated 
patent plaintiffs). 
RISCH IN PRINTER (FN CORRECTION) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  8:26 AM 
2013] PATENT PORTFOLIOS AS SECURITIES 147 
valuation. These criticisms of backward citations are unsurprising, 
given evidence that patent examiners simply do not read references 
cited by patent applicants.289 
iii. Originality and Generality.  Two other citation measures that 
may prove helpful are originality and generality.290 Originality 
measures the technological breadth of backward references.291 The 
wider the breadth, the more likely the patent is considered new; the 
narrower the breadth, the more likely the patent is incremental to one 
specific field.292 Generality measures the technology distribution of 
forward citations—patents citing the patent at issue.293 The broader 
the distribution of technology that relies on the patent, the more 
general and valuable the original patent might be. For example, the 
forward citations for physicist William Shockley’s transistor patent294 
are quite general, spanning many different fields. Some studies have 
found that more valuable patents have both more originality and 
more generality as compared with the average patent, including the 
average patent in the same technology field.295 
iv. Number of Patents.  Whereas a simple count of patents should 
not be enough to price a portfolio, ignoring the number of patents 
would ignore economic reality. Quite simply, the larger the portfolio, 
the more valuable it will be, even if the individual patents have 
relatively low value.296 However, size must be combined with breadth 
of technology and quality. If the portfolio is large, but spotty and 
 
 289. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant Patent 
Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844, 844 (2013) (“We find, to our surprise, that patent 
examiners did not use applicant-submitted art in the rejections that narrowed claims before 
these patents issued, relying almost exclusively on prior art they find themselves.”). 
 290. See Manuel Trajtenberg, Rebecca Henderson & Adam B. Jaffe, University Versus 
Corporate Patents: A Window on the Basicness of Invention, in ADAM B. JAFFE & MANUEL 
TRAJTENBERG, PATENTS, CITATIONS & INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY 60, 63 (2002) (defining generality and originality).  
 291. Id. at 63. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 60. 
 294. U.S. Patent No. 2,569,347 (filed June 26, 1948). 
 295. Kramer, supra note 10, at 479–80. 
 296. See, e.g., Alfonse Gambardella, Professor of Corporate Mgmt., Bocconi Univ., 
Presentation to the OECD Conference on Patent Practice & Innovation, The Value of Patent 
Portfolios: Numbers vs Average Quality 20 (May 10, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/
innovationinsciencetechnologyandindustry/workshop-patent-practice-and-innovation-
Gambardella.pdf (showing the role of number of patents in portfolio value). 
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weak, then it will not be as valuable as a focused and strong 
portfolio.297 Similarly, if the portfolio is too narrow, then a large size 
may not provide sufficient coverage.298 Thus, any pricing method 
should include an objective measure of both size and breadth. 
d. Patent Claims as Indicators.  Some studies have found the 
number of claims relevant to value.299 Counting claims has an 
ambiguous connection to value. Although one study implies that 
more claims are associated with expected quality,300 that same study 
shows that the number of claims is unrelated to the probability that 
maintenance fees were paid.301 Failure to pay maintenance fees causes 
a patent to expire early, and is the best indicator of the owner’s belief 
(or lack thereof) in its value.302 The study shows, therefore, that 
economic value is not correlated with the number of claims. Another 
study shows a negative correlation, finding that some patents with 
more claims are more likely to be invalidated.303 
Despite the ambiguities associated with claim counts, it is 
unlikely that any pricing formula that excludes claim information 
would be accepted.304 Thus, some objective, measurable method of 
analyzing claims must be available in pricing formulas.305 
One potential way to use claims is to measure the ratio of 
backward references and forward citations per claim. One study 
showed that an increasing number of backward references for each 
claim implied lower quality, whereas increasing forward citations per 
claim implied increased quality.306 The implication is that patents with 
few claims but many references are incremental. Nonetheless, if a 
 
 297. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 41 (“But such an atomized portfolio 
would be relatively ineffective in size-terms because of the significant gaps in subject matter 
coverage between constituent patents, creating what might be called a ‘swiss cheese effect.’”). 
 298. Id. 
 299. Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 277, at 10.  
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 16.  
 302. Cf. Schankerman, supra note 275 (valuing patents by renewal rate).  
 303. Allison et al., supra note 288, at 681, 706. 
 304. See Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 205 (“All [interviewed in-house counsel], 
however, believed that the only true measure of a patent’s value comes only after analyzing a 
patent’s claims.”). 
 305. See id. (“Interestingly, the co-founder of an intellectual property analytics company 
shared this same view. He suggested that one can employ highly quantitative measures coupled 
with sophisticated algorithms to develop proxies for value.”). 
 306. Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 277, at 10–11. 
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patent with few claims is cited by many others, then that patent is 
more likely to be important. 
In any event, patents with more claims are more likely to be 
litigated,307 which may indicate an increased value to buyers or 
potential licensees, even if not related to the underlying technology’s 
value. As a result, a portfolio with many claims may command a 
higher price, regardless of patent quality. This counterintuitive result 
is not without support. In fact, one theory suggests that as the value of 
each individual patent falls, we should expect to see larger and larger 
patent portfolios (which will necessarily have more claims in the 
aggregate).308 
Perhaps a better measure of value would be counting claim 
elements, rather than claims.309 To be invalidated, every single claim 
must be found in the prior art or considered obvious. Thus, claims 
with more elements are more likely to be valid, because they are 
more likely to have an element that is not included in the prior art. 
Similarly, to infringe, one must practice every single element of the 
claim. This means that claims with more elements are less likely to be 
infringed, because companies should more easily design around a 
claim with many elements.310 In short, the more claim elements there 
are, the less valuable the patent. 
Additionally, words introduced in claim elements can be 
compared with patent specifications to approximate compliance with 
disclosure requirements and claim scope.311 Additionally, elements 
 
 307. Allison et al., supra note 270, at 451–53; Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 277, at 
18. 
 308. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 53 (“In other words, because the true 
value of patents lies in their aggregation (in large numbers), firms seeking patent protection are 
increasingly forced to do so via a high-quantity, portfolio-focused patenting strategy.”). 
 309. See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, The Shape of Things To Come: What We Can Learn from 
Patent Claim Length, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 617, 632–34 (2012) 
(finding that claim length varies based on whether the claim is dependent or independent). 
 310. Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 201. Meeks and Eldering use the number of 
elements as an initial indication of scope. For portfolio pricing, further detailed analysis of claim 
elements could become costly. Indeed, they suggest performing a complete claim construction. 
Id. at 201–08. Unfortunately, claim construction is one of the most hotly disputed parts of any 
litigation, and district court orders are reversed about a third of the time. David L. Schwartz, 
Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent 
Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 248–49 (2008). As such, a complete claim construction is unlikely 
to be a low cost, highly accurate method of patent valuation. 
 311. F. Russell Denton, Rolling Equilibriums at the Pre-Commons Frontier: Identifying 
Patently Efficient Royalties for Complex Products, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 48, 69–72 (2009) 
(proposing use of descriptive factors to value patents). 
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might be combined with the number of technology classes in the 
patent to assess claim scope.312 Thus, using some measure of claim 
elements, perhaps interactively with backward references, technology 
class, and specification, may yield helpful information about the value 
of a portfolio. 
e. Less Useful Indicators.  Some indicators historically linked to 
patent quality may not be as helpful for patent-pricing decisions. For 
example, some studies have considered parallel patents (sometimes 
called “patent families”) in other countries.313 Intuitively, companies 
will be willing to spend more money to patent in other countries if 
they believe the patent to be valuable. Analytical estimates have 
shown just that.314 However, in the case of aggregation, foreign patent 
filings may not be a helpful indicator of portfolio pricing. As noted 
above, many aggregated patents come from individuals, who may not 
have had the resources for foreign filings no matter how valuable 
their patents are. 
Similarly, maintenance payments (also known as renewal 
payments) may be the single most accurate indicators of patent 
value,315 but are entirely unhelpful for patent pricing. The reason is 
that expired patents, including those that expire due to lack of 
maintenance payments, may not be enforced, and attempts to license 
such patents may be considered an antitrust violation.316 As such, their 
value in patent portfolios is zero. 
As a result, payment of fees becomes an unhelpful metric for 
pricing a specific licensed portfolio, even if they are extremely helpful 
for measuring the value of patents held by a company, a country, or 
an issuing in a technology area. By definition, every patent in a 
licensed portfolio has had its fees paid, so that metric ceases to have 
explanatory meaning. Of course, as noted above, such payments 
continue to be very important to determine what other patent 
characteristics might be correlated with the decision to pay. 
 
 312. See Joshua Lerner, The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis, 25 RAND 
J. ECON. 319, 320 (1994) (discussing claim scope in terms of patent classes). 
 313. E.g. Jonathan Putnam, The Value of International Patent Rights (1996) (unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 314. Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 277, at 18. 
 315. Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1550 (2005); see 
Allison et al., supra note 270, at 440–41.  
 316. See Evelyn M. Sommer, Patent License Restrictions, 59 CONN. B.J. 236, 249–53 (1985) 
(stating that collecting royalties from expired patents may be considered an antitrust violation). 
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Characteristics associated with a high payment rate will indicate a 
higher value, whereas characteristics associated with a low payment 
rate will indicate a lower value. 
f. Crowdsourcing.  To the extent that objective yet qualitative 
information about a patent is desired for pricing, crowdsourcing may 
be a way to inexpensively learn more about patents in a portfolio. For 
example, Article One Partners (Article One) is a company devoted to 
crowdsourced prior-art collection.317 Its thousands of members scour 
the earth for prior art in many different languages. Thus, before any 
transaction, the parties could submit a random sample of patents (or 
the patents most likely to be infringed) for a prior-art study. This 
would allow the parties to resolve some validity disputes at a much 
lower cost than litigation. Indeed, patent owners could submit their 
own patents to present comprehensive data at the time of offering. If 
patents are to be treated as securities, such disclosures would be in 
line with offering memoranda that barrage potential buyers with all 
the information available about the offered security. 
Crowdsourcing might also be used to determine which patents 
are core to a technology. For example, Article One offers “State of 
the Art Studies,” in which its members find as many patents as 
possible relating to a certain technology.318 Using this technique, 
parties would ask members to find all patents relating to, say, mobile 
phone antennas. After a few days (or weeks), the parties could 
evaluate who owns the patents that users thought important, and 
determine what percentage of those patents were in the offered 
portfolio. Article One has published the results of such studies in the 
past.319 
Crowdsourcing need not stop at prior art, however. If there are 
questions about the breadth of patent claims, then users of 
Mechanical Turk could help.320 Mechanical Turk offers the services of 
millions of “micro task” users, who get paid as little as a penny to 
 
 317. ARTICLE ONE PARTNERS, http://www.articleonepartners.com (last visited Aug. 20, 
2013).  
 318. Weekly Discussion: Guaranteed Rewards, ARTICLE ONE PARTNERS (Apr. 27, 2010), 
http://www.articleonepartners.com/newsletter/20100427.html. 
 319. Marshall Phelps & Cheryl Milone, LTE Standard Essential Patents Now and in the 
Future, ARTICLE ONE PARTNERS (Feb. 2012), http://newsletters.articleonepartners.com/news_
f1317eac-ee13-5a66-d0f5-38ea99a4c1eeLTE-Standard-Essential-Patents-Now-and-in-the-
Future.pdf. 
 320. See MECHANICAL TURK, http://www.mechanicalturk.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
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perform a simple but potentially repetitive task. Customers 
submitting tasks to the website can ask that only users with particular 
skills and accuracy rates participate. Thus, licensing parties could 
submit patent claims to technically inclined Mechanical Turk users, 
asking them to submit the name of one product that might be 
infringing the patent claim for a penny. For a mere $100, parties could 
get a sample of ten thousand potentially infringing products. For 
$1,000, the parties could get a list of ten potentially infringing 
products associated with each of ten thousand different patents. The 
licensing parties could use the frequency that the accused product 
shows up on the list to determine the potential scope of the claims 
and the scope of the portfolio. 
4. Prospects.  Despite the myriad ways that patent portfolios 
might be valued, an efficient method of pricing may be difficult to 
achieve in practice. Even if a formula with objective indicia were 
developed, that might not be enough for particular institutional 
buyers. For example, Microsoft evaluates patents based on at least 
three criteria: the potential for licensing or resale revenue, the 
potential to reduce litigation risk, and the potential strategic value 
(such as providing exclusive rights to technology or dissuading 
competitors from implementing a feature).321 These three criteria are 
interrelated, but each is informed by a very different analysis, some of 
which is necessarily subjective to the company rather than based on 
objectively measurable criteria. Thus, although company stock may 
have differing values for different holders (for example, majority 
ownership might command a premium), patent portfolios may always 
have a different value to every company that considers them. 
As a result, critics may be concerned that any pricing set will not 
reflect the “true” pricing of a portfolio. Instead, they worry that 
undue leverage from aggregation, hold-up, and other transactions 
costs will inflate the actual cost above the “real” cost.322 
This may be true, but securities laws can certainly help by forcing 
additional disclosures that will aid in pricing and reducing 
information asymmetry. 
Further, the notion that there is a “true” cost of any portfolio is 
an incomplete picture of market transactions. As noted above, 
purchasers—but also licensees—are not completely helpless. They 
 
 321. Kelley, supra note 1, at 127–28. 
 322. Carrier, supra note 61, at 3. 
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can refuse to license and force the patentee to file suit, a potentially 
costly affair. They can negotiate prices based on the size and quality 
of portfolios. They can cross-license patents. They can agree not to 
infringe certain patents. In short, even if the price is “inflated” in the 
eyes of an outside observer, the transaction price represents the 
willingness to pay for the patents at that time, and is thus the market-
clearing price. Like it or not, this is the value of the portfolio to the 
specific parties at that specific time. 
To be sure, that price may not be the price that infinite 
competitors would bid with full information for an asset of known 
value. The efficient price may be unknowable and unachievable, even 
with the aid of securities rules. The goal of some of the objective 
pricing methods discussed above is internalization of inefficiency 
concerns, such as bargaining leverage, technology, and 
commercialization using objective indicia.323 These more complex 
models might even include aspects of game theory to replicate the 
types of subjective considerations and negotiations that hinder 
current valuation methodologies.324 
CONCLUSION 
The definition of securities is deliberately both broad and 
flexible. Though treating patent portfolio transactions as investment 
contracts may push the limits of that definition, such transactions 
arguably fall within the definition set forth by the Supreme Court. 
More importantly, the reasons for treating such transactions as 
security transactions reflect the purposes of securities laws. In the 
wrong environment—indeed, the environment some people believe 
currently exists—portfolio owners can holdup potential licensees by 
threatening to enforce a vast portfolio of patents. Although that 
threat will likely never be fully alleviated, securities treatment can 
help. 
First, such treatment can assist with market integrity. Public sale 
restrictions would not be very helpful because most licenses would 
likely fall under some exception. Further, a law that denied the ability 
to license at all (which the securities laws envision) would be awful; it 
would force patent holders to sue small potential licensees in the first 
 
 323. See Denton & Heald, supra note 9, at 1219–24 (describing ways to incorporate data into 
an option-pricing formula). 
 324. Id. at 1236–37 (discussing the role of game theory in patent valuation). 
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instance because small companies could not license without violating 
the law. This worst-case scenario is unlikely; most transactions would 
likely fall into an exemption. 
Even if private sales are the norm, rules that regulate material 
misstatements or omissions of fact—truth telling—might be very 
beneficial in the market. Such rules might limit misstatements by 
licensors about companies that had licensed in the past, about the 
existence of prior art, or of some other fact that might affect the value 
of the portfolio. In other words, if patents in the portfolio are 
invalidated, all licensees might have an affirmative cause of action for 
securities fraud due to the omitted facts associated with the patents. 
Perhaps this requirement might help level the negotiating table. 
Second, treating portfolios as securities might aid in market 
formation. From a regulatory standpoint, securities laws limit the use 
of “dark markets,” so that transactions would be handled by a 
clearinghouse. Companies are beginning to create such 
clearinghouses, and legal rules would only accelerate formation. 
Clearinghouses, in turn, would help connect buyers with sellers, 
identify technologies claimed by patent owners, and reveal pricing to 
other market participants. 
From an encouragement point of view,325 simply calling each 
transaction a securities transaction might incentivize the 
implementation of objective pricing methodologies. These pricing 
methodologies serve the market in two ways: they reduce the effect of 
potential hold-up on patent pricing, and they reduce transaction costs. 
There is no wholesale cure to the problem of hold-up for 
aggregated patent portfolios. Assuming that aggregation is here to 
stay, and that all types of companies are aggregating patents, treating 
patent portfolios as securities could go a long way toward easing 
concerns. 
 
 325. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (arguing that default rules can 
encourage behavior even if the rules can be avoided without legal penalty). 
